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The purpose of this thesis is to address if microfinance institutions (MFIs) 
facilitate poverty reduction in Bangladesh. The research begins with an overview of the 
historical, institutional, and political underpinnings of poverty in Bangladesh and then 
surveys quantitative findings to determine the extent to which the rural poor’s income can 
be augmented. Resources furnishing this analysis include panel data drawn from MFI 
borrowers in randomly selected villages that have branches serviced by Grameen Bank, 
Association for Social Advancement (ASA), and Bangladesh Rural Advancement 
Committee (BRAC). In addition, by addressing development indicators, microcredit’s 
non-economic outcomes—or spillover effects—are also measured, including literacy and 
infant mortality. In order to address MFIs’ more difficult-to-measure spillover effects, 
this thesis also treats the notions of civil society and women’s empowerment as relevant 
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Over the past two to three decades, microfinance—the provision of loans and 
other financial services to those, typically the poor, who lack access to traditional 
financial intermediaries—has become a major form of assistance through which 
development agencies have attempted to aid poor nations, especially with the goal of 
raising millions above the poverty line. The concept of microfinance was pioneered in 
Bangladesh by Muhammad Yunus, who created the Grameen Bank in 1976 in order to 
create credit opportunity for the poor.1 Since then, there have been hundreds of similar 
“Grameen-like” banks established. Despite having had a great deal of this and other 
forms of developmental assistance, Bangladesh continues to face high levels of poverty 
and other developmental challenges. In fact, one-third of Bangladesh’s population 
continues to live in extreme poverty.2 As a response to the nation’s poverty level and the 
lack of opportunity available for its poor, 686 microfinance institutions now exist within 
the country.3 Given this setting, this thesis addresses if microfinance loans lead to a 
reduction in poverty and, if so, under what conditions. 
This thesis uses the terms microfinance and microcredit interchangeably, and 
examines “microentrepreneurs,” who come from low-income households.4 The topic is 
addressed by surveying outcomes on poverty reduction and further determining which 
variables condition the effects of microfinance on poverty reduction. This is done by 
looking at case studies that track the income of borrowers and non-borrowers within the 
village level in Bangladesh. 
 
                                                 
1 David Lewis, Bangladesh: Politics, Economy and Civil Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011) 115. 
2 Ibid., 158. 
3 Microcredit Regulatory Authority, “List of Licensed MFIs as of March 01, 2016,” accessed March 
23, 2016, http://www.mra.gov.bd/images/Licensed_NGO_MFIs/licenced250216en.pdf. 
4 Grameen Bank for Small Business RSS, “What Is Microcredit,” last modified March 2, 2012, 
http://www.grameen-info.org/what-is-microcredit/. 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION  
The primary research question is: 
How do microfinance programs contribute to poverty reduction? 
The impact of microfinance on poverty reduction is a significant area of study, 
particularly for development practitioners and academics interested in the aggregate 
effect of such programs on poverty reduction. Despite being a major element of 
development practice for decades, there is still much to be learned about the extent to 
which microfinance programs actually reduce levels of poverty across different economic 
classes—and under what conditions this occurs. 
Daniel Lewis argues that “Bangladesh is at a crossroads of sorts, and faces a 
number of pressing dilemmas,” including its poverty level.5 The outcome of Bangladeshi 
development schemes is important for practitioners to study because it may enable them 
to better address specific development needs. Tracking the outcomes and possible 
spillover effects of specific types of microlending programs provide a lens through which 
progress can be measured. For example, we can analyze if there are any positive gender-
related outcomes that may contribute to expanding the rights and role of women, which 
in turn, perhaps indirectly, encourages poverty reduction. By contrast, we can also seek to 
find if there are any unintended effects of mobilizing microloan programs within 
particular communities of the low-income population. A study of microlending offers an 
opportunity to consider how to increase the quality of life of the world’s poorest. In turn, 
more prosperous societies in which human security is guaranteed tend to be more secure 
and less violent, thus creating indirect connections to broader international security 
concerns.  
  
                                                 
5 Lewis, Bangladesh, 9. 
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B. THESIS STATEMENT 
This thesis contends that microcredit can alleviate symptoms of poverty. Research 
to support this claim includes how microcredit programs augment income levels for poor 
rural households while in the non-economic spillover effects of microcredit will be 
analyzed. 
Microfinance is a significant research topic for policy makers and academics to 
consider, as the bourgeoning microcredit market is helping to reimagine ways financial 
tools and instruments can couple with social and development programs in the 
developing world. An overview of the origins of microfinance demonstrates that the poor 
lack sufficient opportunity to raise themselves out of poverty, and advocates such as Dr. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter reviews current literature on microfinance as a form of poverty 
alleviation. The focus is to draw attention to the breadth of views regarding how 
microfinance can and cannot be used—for example, is it a development tool, or is it a 
way to reform social constructs?—and, if these hold true, to determine if there is a link to 
poverty reduction.  
A. DEFINING “MICROFINANCING” 
Addressing the outcomes of microfinance on poverty reduction requires first 
defining what it is. One widely used definition suggests that microfinance is made of 
“small scale transactions in credit savings designed to meet the needs of small and 
medium-scale producers and businesses.”6 Then there are structural mechanisms to 
consider, in which the main characteristics of microloan schemes can vary. The course of 
this thesis will also delve beyond this definition, addressing several other attributes of 
microcredit—such as that it is a tool that allows for savings and insurance, it is a form of 
empowerment, and borrowers are taught valuable skills and knowledge.  
Thus, microfinance was intended as a means to allow the poor to help themselves, 
with particular focus on financial credit services. One reason the poor living in 
Bangladesh have not been able to secure loans has been that they do not have acceptable 
collateral, as well as for the fact that the costs associated with vetting poor loan 
candidates (who often live in the rural outskirts) are too high to make lending to the poor 
profitable.7 Thus, since the 1970s, the poor in Bangladesh gained greater access to credit 
because of the creation of microfinance programs.8 
                                                 
6 Shahidur R. Khandker, “Microfinance and Poverty: Evidence Using Panel Data from Bangladesh,” 
The World Bank Economic Review 19 no. 2 (Oxford University Press, 2005): 263, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40282216. 
7 Lewis, Bangladesh, 115. 
8 Niels Hermes and Robert Lensink, “The Empirics of Microfinance: What Do We Know?” The 
Economic Journal 117 no. 517 (2007), F1, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4625473. 
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Poverty, or those living within poverty, is defined as those living with incomes of 
less than one dollar a day.9 To begin addressing what poverty is, I address Banerjee’s and 
Duflo’s discussion of poverty, as some critics believe poverty cannot be reduced because 
of the notion of the “poverty trap.” Economists such as Jeff Sachs argue that “the poor 
are poor because they are poor.”10 He contends that this may be circumstantial, such as 
being landlocked geographically, or because of bad luck. As a response to these 
conditions, he states the poor need a “big push” (economically speaking) that will enable 
them towards a more profitable future.11 However, within the literature of poverty traps, 
other critics such as William Easterly believe poor individuals need to search for their 
own solutions, while aid is only a corrupting influence. In addition, the free markets and 
incentives will compel the poor to be creative in solving their problems.12 He further cites 
the phenomenon of poor countries becoming rich and vice versa. Thus, if the conditions 
of poverty can be altered, then the notion of a poverty trap is not feasible.13 
Microfinance, then, is a concept that may bridge these two schools of thought.  
There are a handful of possible causal factors that contribute to microfinance 
lowering levels of poverty; the goal of this thesis is to explore which mechanisms of 
microfinance institutions affect different elements of poverty reduction outcomes. A great 
deal has been written about this topic and this thesis synthesizes state of the art literature, 
applying it specifically to Bangladesh to assess Bangladesh’s experience with 
microlending. For example, Authors Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo discuss what 
microfinance is in order to demonstrate the parameters of how, and under what 
circumstances, microlending programs can be used to facilitate poverty reduction. To do 
this, they examine the nature of microfinance, both its different applications and 
intentions. In addition, the authors give examples of saving behavior to explain 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 462. 
10 Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo, Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight 
Global Poverty (New York: Public Affairs, 2011) 9. 
11 Banerjee and Duflo, Poor Economics, 9. 
12 Ibid., 4. 
13 Ibid., 10. 
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mechanisms that allow certain borrowers to be successful while other borrowers are not 
able to utilize lending programs.14  
Banerjee and his collaborators address the conditions under which microloans are 
effective. One theory Banerjee suggests is the fact that microloans are effective in 
facilitating increased income for small business owners who already have income, as the 
additional loan funding contributes to the ability to build assets.15 However, this conflicts 
with Lewis’s discussion that only the core poor benefit from microcredit, and there is 
insignificant change for those who had income generation capacity.16 Another strand of 
thought includes that targeting of participants contributes to levels of success. For 
example, a third theory around microfinance states that targeting women leads to higher 
success rates than solely targeting men.   
Research on these questions includes a number of quantitative studies, which this 
thesis utilizes. Economists Shahidur Khandker and M. Jahangir Chowdhury point to the 
income creating aspects of microloan programs; further illustrating the impact of 
increased income on consumption and household well-being. Khandker contends that 
microloans, as forms of poverty interventions, help the poor access self-employment 
opportunities and thus generate increased levels of income.17 Meanwhile, Armendariz 
and Morduch demonstrate that the poor are motivated to invest borrowed credit in their 
business, growing the potential that microfinance institutions (MFIs) offer.18  
Further findings illustrate the effect of microfinance programs in creating an 
interdependent network of responsibility, which indirectly has a push and pull effect on 
                                                 
14 Banerjee and Duflo, Poor Economics, 9. 
15 Abhijit Banerjee et al., The Miracle of Microfinance? Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation 
(Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2013), http://economics.mit.edu/files/5993. 
16 Lewis, Bangladesh, 115. 
17 Khandker, “Microfinance and Poverty,” 266; M. Jahangir Alam Chowdhury, “Poverty and 
Microfinance: An Investigation into the Role of Microcredit in Reducing the Poverty Level of borrowing 
Households in Bangladesh and the Philippines,” The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International 
Relations (2008) 28–30, 34. 
18 Beatriz Armendariz and Jonathan Morduch, The Economics of Microfinance, Second Edition 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2010) 145. 
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borrowers.19 The outcome of this effect is increased participation that facilitates 
repayment and therefore leads to increased access to credit and services, which may 
facilitate poverty reduction. However, there are academics, including Beatriz Armendariz 
and Jonathan Morduch, who question the role of microcredit as being limited to an 
intervention tool: they believe it can serve a broader role towards economic development. 
They contend that small scale lending reduces the inefficiency in production and 
consumption that are the result of imperfect credit markets. By reviewing how the poor 
save and build-up assets, the authors examine how microfinance organizations contradict 
institutional deficiencies. In addition, the authors address challenges that microfinance 
groups face with regards to delivering financial products at costs that the poor and 
providers can both afford. In turn, these challenges have been addressed by innovative 
payment schemes, which will be addressed in Chapter III. 
Furthermore, Armendariz and Morduch believe microfinance is successful in 
reducing poverty because of two main features. First, microfinance is an innovative tool 
within the credit market. Secondly, microfinance serves as a development agenda.20 This 
research aligns with the views of Sayantan Bera, who contends that the lending products 
have transitioned from credit intervention towards “livelihood finance.” He asserts that it 
is this transitional process that has allowed microfinance to be able to adapt and thus lend 
to positive effects for the poor.21 
B. INNOVATION 
The innovation aspect of Armendariz and Morduch’s discussion is relevant to this 
thesis because it focuses on how microfinance has overcome market failures in order to 
reach the poor. While state-run banks have failed in providing credit access to the poor—
which in effect has exacerbated poverty levels—microfinance has created innovative 
ways to reduce costs associated with lending. Because these costs have been lowered, 
                                                 
19 Shahidur Khandker, Review of The Economics of Microfinance: Economic Development and 
Cultural Change 56, no.2 (University of Chicago Press, 2008) doi:10.1086/523604. 
20 Khandker, Review of The Economics of Microfinance, 484. 
21 Sayantan Bera, “Programme Design and Impact Assessments: ‘Success’ of Microfinance in 
Perspective,” Economic and Political Weekly 43, no. 32 (2008): 77, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40277833. 
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microfinance has catered to the needs of the poor to a greater extent than formal banks. In 
addition, savings and insurance programs offered to the poor through microfinance 
programs are an outcome of this innovation. This innovation then, enables microcredit 
lenders to reach and help more people living in poverty, and nuances tied to changing 
shifting behavior may set the stage for long-term poverty reduction.22 Bera affirms that 
microfinance serves those with limited or no assets, and it also serves the income poor. In 
addition, this target market is made of informal networks that rely on social ties and 
cultural proximity. As a consequence, there is less likelihood of issues with information 
and enforcement. This then culminates into a joint liability structure, which relies on 
social trust. The Grameen Bank attributes its successful repayment record on the fact that 
this self-selection process bypasses adverse selection problems. In addition, this selection 
process results in peer monitoring that does away with moral hazard issues.23 
Supporting the notion that microcredit is successful because it is innovative are 
studies that reflect upon the conception that, by fostering a creative market for lending 
tools, commercial banks too are now entering the microlending sector. Hermes and 
Lensink believe this entry will generate a more competitive lending market. They also 
argue, while on one hand, that this will lead to reduced lending to the poor, it may mean 
more income levels can participate in lending schemes. In turn, this may improve overall 
financial sustenance.24 To support these claims, they associate the availability of credit 
access to increased incomes in Bangladesh, which allows for a rise in investments that 
will allow for greater income potential.25  
The joint liability feature of microfinance is another innovative design that allows 
small scale lending to be successful in reducing poverty. However, some analysts believe 
the effectiveness of programs goes beyond just this element. Bera believes the resultant 
incentive mechanism that is derived from joint liability is what drives success, not the 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 485. 
23 Bera, “Programme Design and Impact Assessments,” 79. 
24 Hermes and Lensink, “Impact of Microfinance,” 462. 
25 Ibid., 463. 
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joint liability feature alone.26 In order to verify this claim, Bera suggests using impact 
evaluation methodologies. He narrows his assessment to the relationship between high 
repayment rates and outcomes.27 Niels Hermes and Robert Lensink also address the 
incentive mechanism of joint liability. They contend that incentive mechanisms are social 
outcomes that arise out of joint lending. When a group of borrowers are jointly 
responsible for repayment of a loan, individuals are inclined to monitor one another. If a 
person is suspected of being a high-risk borrower, they are kicked out of the group, which 
has direct communal consequences. Individuals’ desire to avoid the shaming element of 
this phenomenon is what contributes to microfinance being an effective program.28  
Bera also discusses incentive structures. In practice, microfinance lenders employ 
an array of incentive mechanisms that are designed to ensure repayment and 
sustainability. These include “sequential financing,” “progressive lending,” “contingent 
renewal,” and “regular repayment schedules.” An ability of these features to help 
facilitate poverty reduction is the fact that they can be applied in non-homogenous urban 
populations as well as rural communities.29 
C. DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 
Authors Armendariz and Morduch further contend that even more significant than 
the financial spectrum of microfinance to reduce poverty is its development agenda.30 
While formal banks do not reach the poor, they certainly do not reach the core poor, 
moderately poor, or poor women. Microfinance, thus, has a development aspect, because 
its targeting mechanism allows for prospective borrowers to be more responsible in how 
they utilize credit and repay loans. In turn, the joint lending mechanism activates good 
behavior, especially within female-based borrowing groups, as they are more vulnerable 
or susceptible to social pressures.31 Another way microfinance resonates with the poor to 
                                                 
26 Bera, “Programme Design and Impact Assessments,” 77. 
27 Ibid., 79. 
28 Hermes and Lensink, “Impact of Microfinance,” 463. 
29 Bera, “Programme Design and Impact Assessments,” 80. 
30 Khandker, Review of The Economics of Microfinance, 485. 
31 Bera, “Programme Design and Impact Assessments,” 79. 
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contribute to development is the way in which it inculcates social trust. Under this 
context, because joint lending is an explicit communal process, it has become an 
instrument for building social capital. This is possible because of the creation of 
horizontal networks, where forms of reciprocity are shared; further enabling individuals 
to trust one another. As a consequence, this trust element becomes embedded into the 
village network. In order to maintain this trust, the structure of microfinance involves 
participants having to interact repeatedly with their associates, developing social trust and 
thereby replacing individual norms with shared norms.32 Armendariz and Morduch 
further allude to microfinance as a tool that mobilizes savings and serves as an insurance 
against income and consumption risks. Goals they address out of this include lowering 
vulnerability, hedging risk, and accomplishing greater levels of efficiency. These 
attributes, then, are ways poverty reduction can be enhanced through microfinance.33 
Other authors also consider the development aspect of microfinance within poor 
households. Pitt and Khandker consider the effects of group-based credit programs on 
labor supply and schooling.34 The study finds that credit programs have a wider effect on 
the behavior of women, who—through increased empowerment- are more likely to spend 
on investments related to their household (such as education) than are men. They also 
agree with the notion that social pressure establishes conditions conducive for poverty 
reduction.35 Furthermore, after studying consumption habits, the authors further agree 
women are better suited to partake in microlending programs than are men.36  
An attempt can be made to correlate this suitability to the role of empowerment, 
which Dr. Abdul Basher undertakes in his study of the spillover effects of microcredit. 
Basher articulates the possibility that microcredit programs have effect on non-economic 
activities, thereby having a spillover effect on aspects that may contribute to poverty 
                                                 
32 Bayulgen, “Muhammad Yunus, Grameen Bank and the Nobel Peace Prize” 533. 
33 Khandker, Review of The Economics of Microfinance, 485. 
34 Mark Pitt and Shahidur R. Khandker, “The Impact of Group‐based Credit Programs on Poor 
Households in Bangladesh: Does the Gender of Participants Matter?” Journal of Political Economy 106, 
no. 5 (University of Chicago Press, 1998): 958, doi:10.1086/250037. 
35 Ibid., 962. 
36 Ibid., 958. 
 12
reduction. For example, the paper studies the phenomenon of participants of lending 
programs having reduced rates of fertility. As a result, it may be assessed that smaller 
family sizes reduce the economic footprint of a household. Basher also acknowledges the 
empowerment of women through microcredit programs and he addresses the gap in 
literature that describes how female borrowers are empowered. It is common for analysts 
to describe such achievement on the basis of changing economic behavior, such as the 
ability to spend more on food. Instead, Basher seeks to study empowerment by means of 
non-economic activities, such as the ability to contest social values.  
Other analysts have also found that gender-based targeting of microloan programs 
has a positive influence on poverty reduction. For example, Khandker reports of instances 
of women who acquire small loans experience improved levels of household and 
individual welfare, referring to the occurrence of “consumption smoothing” lending to 
increased quality of life.37  
Meanwhile, Khandker offers a critique to the effects of income generation, stating 
that even if its effects on household income are positive, because microfinance only 
reaches about a quarter of the population within Bangladesh, only about 1% of the 
population will be lifted out of poverty.38 To this point, authors Armendariz and Morduch 
ultimately find that available research does not lend to the fact that microfinance can 
provide substantial gains for borrowers. However, the Grameen bank, along with other 
World Bank sponsored programs, would disagree. Their findings demonstrate that 
microfinance can serve as a valuable tool in decreasing poverty rates, empowering 
women, and facilitating other features of development.39  
Oksan Bayulgen offers yet another dimension, reflecting on ways in which 
microfinance contributes to activating the poor and thereby empowers them towards 
action that helps them help themselves out of poverty. He argues that the link between 
microcredit and empowerment of the poor is self-efficacy and social capital. He accepts 
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that these are fostered through the lending structure of group-based programs, where 
borrowers share the responsibility of loan repayment. Along this line, then, capital is 
shown to be used more effectively, when applied towards education and improving 
human capacity.40 While there are disagreements about the actual outcome of micro-
financing on societal constructs, what is generally believed is that microfinance services 
can lead to individual instances of empowerment. According to Bayulgen, this is possible 
by fostering the development of entrepreneurial programs, which in effect can lead to 
increased income that remains within the control of women. Another positive outcome is 
that such increased income, then, will have spill-over effects that can include increased 
health, nutrition, higher rates of literacy, better housing conditions and lower rates of 
mortality of women and their children.  
Bayulgen’s discussion supports the notion that microfinance is a development 
agenda which creates the conditions for empowerment. First, he argues that microfinance 
allows for perceived self-efficacy, which is defined as the “belief in one’s own efforts to 
control desired outcomes, as opposed to luck or influence of others.”41 Secondly, political 
empowerment is facilitated by the ability of microfinance to lead to public good delivery 
within society. This notion aligns with Dean Karlan and Jacob Appel’s view that for 
microcredit systems to work effectively, social capital and communal interactions are 
required. In particular, group lending dynamics benefit from these mechanisms.42 Thus, 
because of its ability to deliver public goods, microfinance is able to contribute to forms 
of poverty reduction.  
D. CHALLENGES 
Other authors doubt the ability of microcredit to significantly curtail poverty. 
While others have already cited that banks deliberately do not service the poorest, some 
critics further argue that the poorest deliberately choose not to partake in microfinance 
programs. These reasons include that the poor lack confidence, or they deem the loans to 
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be high-risk. In this view, the core poor—the poorest of the poor—are too risk averse to 
be able to invest in their future. In other instances, other members of their respective 
borrowing community perceive the core poor as high risk. In other instances, staff of 
lending institutions may choose to exclude the core poor for the same reason.43  
There are challenges that microfinance structures face as well, which limit how 
well it can be implemented to reduce poverty. Kalpana points to the instance of poor 
villages reverting to self-protection measures of evicting members who are close to 
defaulting. Creating a perception of “bad-risks” within a village is an outcome that 
hinders microfinance programs to work effectively.44 Kalpana further demonstrates that 
this is due to the structural mechanisms of loan programs, of which the hard repayment 
deadlines do not take into consideration stress events that limit the ability of borrowers to 
pay loans on time.45  
Similarly, Lewis raises concerns that MFIs, as large as they have become, are 
running parallel efforts to the government of Bangladesh, thereby weakening the state’s 
ability to serve the poor. He also points to the fact that individuals are not receiving loans 
at every poverty level; and among those who are, only those categorized as “extremely 
poor” are able to generate increased levels of income, not the “moderately poor.”46 The 
question of whether this intervention can reduce rates of growth, and thereby escalate 
rates of poverty47 is an area of future research in its own right. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Advocates of microfinance believe that the income generation and savings aspect 
of microfinance can marginally alleviate poverty, while making it easier for the poor to 
endure income shocks. Furthermore, progressive payment functions augment the earning 
capacity over a period of time. In addition, the social aspects of microcredit programs 
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complement economic reform—through links between increased household income, and 
increased education and healthcare access for children of borrowers. Meanwhile, 
innovative features such as joint lending help to build socially progressive environments, 
while offering women economic opportunity’s that cater to their cultural environment. 
There are, however, risks tied to microlending, as—like commercial loans—they are a 
form of debt, and MFI programs are functioning independent of central regulation, at 
times duplicating Bangladesh’s government’s efforts.  
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III. RESEARCH OVERVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS 
This chapter briefly reviews significant arguments of microfinance that question 
its effectiveness at poverty alleviation. Meanwhile, the research design is explained in 
order to set boundaries as to how information was collected, while the arguments are then 
assessed in Chapter V to determine if microcredit is successful in mitigating poverty. 
A. MICROFINANCE THEORY ASSESSMENT 
This thesis considers three major implications about microfinance. The first 
assessment addresses Khandkar, Pitt and Chowdhury’s argument that microcredit is 
effective in alleviating moderate poverty. In turn, another argument addressed is that only 
poor borrowers benefit, because they are going from “nothing to something.” From this 
angle, it is examined if there are other beneficiaries of MFIs that exist beyond the core 
poor. Finally, the third argument addressed includes that pre-conceived conditions allow 
for microcredit to work most effectively, which includes targeting mechanisms. This 
possibility leads the thesis to consider how microloans are reaching women, and includes 
an assessment of whether women borrowing in comparison to men serves as a variable in 
household poverty reduction.  
Gender based targeting is a variable relevant to consider because of inherent 
cultural and social dynamics that affect debt. Women tend to face greater constraints 
when selecting investments, and are more easily influenced by peer pressure. This 
dynamic, however, has meant that women are more likely to repay loans, leading the 
success of their loans to be more likely, and in turn, allowing women to borrow greater 
amounts. Moreover, when compared to men, the lifestyles of rural women are less 
mobile, which means the proximity they maintain within their communities makes 
monitoring easier. This lower rate of mobility also reduces instances of default, as fear of 
social sanction is more prevalent amongst women than men.48  
Relatedly, individual empowerment is analyzed with regards to financial 
empowerment as well as political empowerment. In addition, this research seeks to 
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establish if there is a relationship between microfinance borrowing, investing and 
savings. Because microfinance options have introduced flexible savings options, 
households are able to accumulate assets at a greater level. Not only that, but seasonal 
consumption needs are smoothed out, while larger expenditures are made possible and 
borrowers are able to protect themselves against shocks. In this way, the deposit feature 
of microfinance schemes makes poverty reduction possible, and is a feature that is 
arguably just as valuable as credit services.49 Thus, the savings mechanism is a variable 
within microfinance that reduces risk, further lending to lower rates of poverty. 
The individual empowerment assessment begins by considering the influence of 
microfinance on political economic development, and its impact on political 
empowerment. The World Bank defines empowerment as “the process of increasing the 
assets and capabilities of individuals or groups to make purposive choices and to 
transform those choices into desired actions and outcomes.”50 Bayulgen has made the 
argument that microcredit can increase the level of political empowerment that is felt by 
borrowers; under the World Bank’s framework, he contends that political empowerment 
provides the poor with information to make political decisions along with the agency to 
act on this information. As a result, the politically empowered poor are more equipped to 
influence the course of their livelihoods, along with the communal decisions that affect 
their community.51 
B. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This research aims to deliver insight into microfinance mechanisms that 
contribute to poverty reduction in Bangladesh. To accomplish this, the research design is 
a single country case study of Bangladesh. In order to adjudicate among the competing 
hypotheses mentioned above, the research focuses on three major microfinance programs 
in Bangladesh: Grameen Bank, the Association for Social Advancement (ASA), and 
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC). These groups have been selected 
                                                 
49 Ibid., 80. 
50 Bayulgen, “Muhammad Yunus, Grameen Bank and the Nobel Peace Prize,” 532. 
51 Ibid., 532. 
 19
because they are amongst the largest microcredit providers within Bangladesh.52 The 
success rates of these different programs vary, while the types of clients and means of 
targeting also vary. Thus, these programs will be treated as a whole, in order to allow 
impacts to be measured in a way that can determine if microfinance is a successful tool in 
poverty reduction. 
In order to conduct a relevant survey, research was furnished using academic 
reports, journals and articles that have been published by leading scholars within the 
microcredit field. For this reason, the thesis especially considers research by current MIT 
Poverty Lab directors Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflow, and the work of Dean Karlan 
and Jacob Appel, who have conducted field reports on microfinance in Bangladesh, citing 
specific case studies within village environments. Their case studies are compared against 
quantitative panel data from World Bank analysts and economists to provide context for 
various theoretical explanations expressed in Chapter V.  
In addition, the thesis draws from scholarly review of historical property rights to 
survey legacies that shaped Bangladesh’s current economic position. The intent of 
drawing on those findings is to introduce how MFIs can play an intermediary role in 
addressing the needs of Bangladesh’s poor. Factors of MFI influence that are examined 
include development indicators, such as literacy and infant mortality. In addition, this 
research seeks to establish intermediate mechanisms: for example, are levels of 
consumption smoothing linked to changes of objective or subjective poverty? Moreover, 
non-economic outcomes are measured by applying quantitative data that supports 
qualitative anecdotes. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The section discussed which of the microfinance arguments are addressed in this 
thesis. The goal of the research analysis is to assess the overall outcomes of program 
participation in order to find how poverty rates can—if at all—be affected. In addition, 
mechanisms that help explain those outcomes are also addressed.  
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IV. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF PRE-COLONIAL BRITISH 
INSTITUTIONS 
Chapter IV of this thesis begins by explaining why Bangladesh is poor, building 
on legacies that have contributed to entrenching the nation into its current state of 
poverty. This background information is pertinent because it provides insight into how 
microfinance can be tailored to improve economic standing. Chapter V includes 
definitions of microfinance and draws a boundary of how poverty reduction is being 
measured. Chapter V is further comprised of a thorough survey of the literature on 
microfinance which lays out more fully how and why microfinance works or does not 
work to reduce poverty. This constitutes a survey of empirical outcomes of programs run 
by the three major MFI’s in Bangladesh. Furthermore, causal relationships are discussed 
to highlight the conditions under which microfinance may be more productive. Chapter 
VI then highlights real-life qualitative examples in order to contextualize broader 
information about the development trajectory of other countries that are following in 
Bangladesh’s footsteps through use of MFIs. Finally, Chapter VI takes stock of the 
findings of comparative research and evaluates which of the hypotheses appears most 
supported by the evidence, as well as assesses which facet of MFIs’ operations appear 
most significant. 
A. WHY BANGLADESH IS POOR TODAY 
Chapter I introduced the level of poverty Bangladesh is facing, emphasizing the 
fact that half of its population lives below the World Bank’s poverty threshold, while 
one-third of its population lives in extreme poverty. Illustrating the significance of the 
poverty level is the Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) ranking of Bangladesh as the 
106th country, out of 160 others countries, in its “quality of life” index, making 
Bangladesh the lowest ranked South Asian country. The EIU arrived at this rank by 
taking into account Bangladesh’s “income poverty, life expectancy, levels of corruption 
and the condition of the country’s institutions.”53 This chapter, then, considers the 
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symbiotic relationship between these factors and how they contribute to Bangladesh’s 
poverty.  
Contributing to Bangladesh’s income poverty is the fact that Bangladesh’s 
economy is based on an agrarian structure, employing roughly 60% of the labor force and 
making up almost 25% of the nation’s GDP.54 The agrarian population is significant for 
this study because 75% of Bangladesh’s population lives in rural areas; with per-head 
income levels one of the lowest in the world, it is their poverty level that contributes to 
Bangladesh’s poverty as a whole. Moreover, with regards to Bangladesh’s institutions, 
village level institutions continue to play a significant role in the daily lives of the rural 
population, creating challenges for state institutions in reaching the poor.55 This 
relationship between village institutions and Bengali citizens, however, highlights the 
capacity at which microfinance programs can fill the absence of the state’s capacity in 
alleviating rural poverty levels.  
In order to provide the contextual background against which to address poverty 
reduction through micro-finance initiatives in Bangladesh today, this chapter study looks 
at the causes of poverty and the unequal distribution of wealth in South Asia writ large. 
In addition, historical factors that have contributed to Bangladesh’s corruption and its 
link to rural poverty levels—including land appropriation, productivity challenges, and 
resource extraction—are addressed. One key feature of this section illustrates Daniel 
Lewis’s assertion that “land has been the key structural asset that has…defined social 
class” within Bangladesh; further serving as a key reason why those without land remain 
poor.56 In order to address factors contributing to Bangladesh’s poverty, three key time 
periods are examined. The first examination includes the time period during the colonial 
rule of the British Raj, the second time frame considers Bangladesh during its existence 
as East Pakistan. The last background section then examines Bangladesh post-
independence.  
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B. INTRODUCING LANDHOLDING POLICIES AND RESOURCE 
EXTRACTION IN BANGLADESH 
Abhijit Banerjee and Lakshmi Iyer address the conditions that set poverty trends 
in motion, arguing that historical institutions shaped long-term effects on the economic 
performance of Bangladesh. The authors draw a correlation between the existence of 
particular historical property rights under the nineteenth century British Raj, and modern 
economic and development outcomes.57 Substantiating this connection to Bangladesh’s 
current economy, is Lewis’ finding that “by the 1980s, landholding census data indicated 
that at least half of Bangladesh’s rural households were now identified as “functionally 
landless,” reflecting the loss of landholdings as a result of forced sale or because of land 
fragmentation.58 Banerjee and Iyer’s study finds that historically landlord-held areas have 
experienced lower distribution rates of public goods as well as reduced levels of 
agricultural productivity, leading to instances of increased poverty. Furthermore, the 
authors find that the existence of particular institutions within the Bengal Presidency of 
India led to explicit administrative policy choices, which have indirectly affected present 
day economic outcomes of pre-colonial states.59 The following section will consider how 
these outcomes set the conditions for poverty within Bangladesh today. By understanding 
the causes of poverty, we can then better determine how to facilitate economic 
development through microfinance.  
Banerjee and Iyer measure how tenure systems within pre-colonial India and 
colonial-India differ across districts in order to demonstrate the correlation between 
property rights and the lack of economic and public development within colonial India. 
They find that there is a measurable relationship between economic performance and 
development of a region, and the type of tenure system used during the regions colonial 
rule as compared to pre-colonial rule.60 This examination is relevant because it addresses 
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how lack of economic development in modern Bangladesh is an inheritance of colonial 
rule. Thus, in order to convey Banerjee and Iyer’s findings, the following sections 
analyze outcomes of pre-colonial land policy in comparison with colonial land policy.61 
In addition to land distribution policies, Bangladesh’s poverty can also be tied to 
legacies of resource extraction. To support this claim, Hamza Alavi argues that Britain’s 
plundering and interference of India’s medieval62 cotton industry devastated India’s long 
term economic prospects, while manifesting into a one-sided dependence on an “import 
substitution strategy” of industrialization.63 In addition, Hamza Alavi and S. Zaidi argue 
that commercialization of India’s agriculture—an outcome stemming from Britain’s 
desire to monopolize India’s cotton market—also contributed to destabilizing India’s 
economic structure.64 The outcome of these practices was the extraction of resources, 
disruption of India as the region’s premier supplier of cotton, and destruction of India’s 
self-sufficiency.65 Land-holding policies and resource extraction are not mutually 
exclusive toward contributing to Bangladesh’s poverty—both have shaped Bangladesh’s 
economic prospects. 
1. Background on Landholding Policies 
The area that constitutes modern day Bangladesh was subject to British rule 
between 1757 and 1947 and formed part of Pakistan until Bangladeshi independence in 
1971. The British colonial government secured significant amounts of revenue by 
extracting land tax throughout different regions. While in some instances, tax collection 
was a continuation of pre-colonial practices, other areas were introduced to this concept 
during the Raj.66 Supplementing this process of the tax collection was industrialization of 
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sectors that the Raj thought were profitable. Thus, the British regime began development 
campaigns in India through the English East India Company. While these trade networks 
led to the building of factories, the profits further enabled successful military campaigns. 
Consequently, battles during the 1700s included the capture of Bengal Presidency, which 
resulted in expanded political control of the Raj, and the expansion of Britain’s 
institutions, which included its tax collection practices.67 
In these taxed areas, local landlords were made responsible for collecting 
payments from the peasantry. In systems that contrasted with this landlord-based system, 
such as individual-based systems, it was the British government that was responsible for 
extracting revenue from agricultural cultivators. Another type of system included the 
village-based system, where the entire community endured the burden of taxes.68 Out of 
these models, it was the landlord-based system that institutionalized tax collection, 
fostering the regime’s ability to expand in other administrative dimensions. By 1841, 
60% of the British regimes revenue was collected through “land revenue systems” or 
“land tenure systems,” both systems referring to the practice of collecting revenue from 
the peasant class. Those responsible for land tax were the implicit holders of the property 
rights of the respective land (also known as zamindari).69 
The landlord-based system led to a monopoly of economic and political power 
because this system distributed the wealth of Bangladesh away from the peasant class and 
into the hands of the zamindars.70 Thus, the following section will focus on the zamindari 
landlord based system because it is a significant cause of poverty within Bangladesh. 
2. Landlord-Based Systems of Tax Extraction 
The landlord system was effective for the British in that it capitalized on the use 
of property right titles. In turn, these titles served as a vehicle that allowed the landlord-
based system to effectively eliminate the need for the British administration to have 
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contact with the peasant class. For instance, in Bengal, landlords were made responsible 
for extracting taxes, and in some areas, the Colonial regime mandated the permanence of 
these revenue commitments, as evidenced by the “Permanent Settlement” act of 1793.71 
However, there was flexibility in other areas, where temporary settlements were enacted. 
For these regions, “the revenue was fixed for a certain number of years, after which it 
was subject to revision.”72 In effect, the landlord-based system required less 
administrative oversight in present day Bangladesh. For this reason, investment in 
production and development of infrastructure seldom took place. This pattern continued, 
as the costs associated with making adjustments to the tax collection mechanism 
sustained the longevity of the landlord system.73 
The existence of landlord based systems led to a handful of economic outcomes. 
One such consequence was the creation of unequal distribution of wealth, which was the 
result of the absence of judiciary protection that set a ceiling to the amount landlords 
could extract from the cultivating class, thus landlords were ideally “position[ed] to 
appropriate most of the gains in productivity.”74 Relatedly, colonial powers created laws 
that granted landlords judicial support in coercing payments in order to extract the 
maximum amount of rent from the peasant class.75 With laws and historical extraction 
practices in their favor, landlords during the nineteenth century—a major period of 
increased economic productivity—grew wealthier while peasants stayed poor, causing 
the rate of inequality to increase.76 Furthermore, this hierarchy of authority became 
entrenched by the fact that zamindari-owned land was very fertile, which led to the 
creation of rent significant enough to entrench a “landlord-tenant-laborer hierarchy.”77 
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The historical distribution of wealth and power in present day Bangladesh is 
significant because it determined the size of the peasantry that could accumulate enough 
capital to be able to invest and further increase productivity. Meanwhile, the distribution 
of wealth created an imbalance between those who cultivated land for their own use, 
versus those who cultivated land for others. Under this context, the latter group 
experienced incentive problems, as ownership and gains belonged to another party. As a 
consequence, agricultural investment and productivity within this group declined. In turn, 
this outcome led to diverging interests between the elite and peasantry within 
Bangladesh, with the elites supporting political programs that safeguarded their land-
holding rights while peasants focused on land reform.78 Out of these opposing interests, 
peasant property became endangered because the poor felt their land would be 
expropriated, which discouraged them from investing in their land.79 Thus, because 
peasant property rights were poorly protected, Bangladesh’s peasants had lower rates of 
productivity, and experienced a decline in their economic performance.  
The nature of political power during the British administration serves as another 
institutionalized element that affected economic outcomes in Bangladesh. In turn, the 
asymmetric balance of power between the landed elite and poor established an 
environment that weakened social trust. Moreover, with the zamindar and peasant 
interests misaligned, it is conceivable that the poor minimally concentrated their political 
support towards long-term platforms that offered public goods; and it is these goods—
such as schools, electricity and running water—that would have allowed for advanced 
development of Bangladesh. Instead, the poor allied behind political promises of land 
reforms, as these platforms addressed more immediate concerns of the peasant 
population. The zamindari structure, however, presented a series of administrative layers 
that prevented the grievances of the poor from being heard by the British administration. 
Thus, the landed elite did not augment living conditions within rural villages, as their 
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own stakes were limited. In this way, the institutionalized hierarchy of political power 
prevented development within Bangladesh.80 
By comparison, non-landlord areas did experience levels of development. This 
can be explained by the fact that—unlike the fixed revenue commitments of the landlord 
based system found in many parts Bangladesh—the British administration could raise 
rents in non-landlord areas, thus providing an incentive to ensure productivity. For this 
reason, the state established “irrigation, railways, schools and other infrastructure. [In] 
this context…almost all canals constructed by the British were in non-landlord areas.”81  
This assessment is supported by empirical data collected by Banerjee and Iyer, 
who find that between 1891–1946, “while non-landlord controlled Madras and Punjab 
showed the greatest increase” of agricultural investment and productivity, the landlord 
based system of the Bengal Presidency experienced a decline in gross agricultural 
output.82 Correlating to this study, Punjab also experienced increased government 
sponsored development, resulting in an expansion of irrigated areas.83 The 
institutionalized land based systems, then, led to particular economic outcomes, with 
areas that had greater amounts of landlord control effectively having less productivity, 
which inherently resulted in a relative decline in development. On the other hand, in areas 
where the British administration felt they could extract greater rents, (non-landlord based 
systems) peasants were more productive and therefore successful. Over time, these 
differences persisted, even after the landlord class was abolished in Bangladesh.84  
Further borrowing from studies conducted by Banerjee and Iyer, they find that 
landlord areas with pre-colonial roots have had less investment in human capital than 
non-landlord areas. This trend has continued past the end of colonial rule, with empirical 
data showing that even in 1981, 21% of landlord areas still had fewer primary schools, 
“while the gap in middle school and high school availability are 60% and 43% 
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respectively.”85 Meanwhile, while less than 2% of all villages have direct access to 
primary health facilities, the presence of such centers in non-landlord area is 37% higher 
than landlord areas.86   
In addition, these differences have translated into a lack of human capital 
accumulation within landlord or former landlord-based systems. The same study finds 
that literacy rates are between 5 to 16 percentage points higher in non-landlord areas. The 
economic and health outcomes in these areas can also be considered under the context of 
infant mortality rates: the study demonstrated that landlord system areas have 40–70% 
greater rates of infant mortality, indicating a relationship between institutionalized 
property rights and development indicators.87 
In their conclusion, Banerjee and Iyer contend that, above the incentive structure 
of the state and inequity with regards to private investment, it was the political 
environment that played the most significant role towards shaping current outcomes of 
Bangladesh. They suggest policy—as demonstrated earlier with regards to political 
platforms that centered on land reform—as drivers of the conditions that have allowed for 
the lack of development of infrastructure, absence of public goods, and the unavailability 
of health facilities.88 In turn, the democratic process within Bangladesh has continued to 
reflect a higher demand for redistribution of land and less attention has been paid to the 
delivery of public goods.89 Bangladesh’s history has articulated this political character in 
the example of class conflict in West Bengal, where landlord areas have experienced 
statistically higher incidents of crime tied to class conflict.90  
Land tax systems under the British were also responsible for commercializing 
India’s agricultural sector, a phenomenon that led to multiple negative repercussions. 
These outcomes included a decline in self-sufficiency, loss of income of the poor, 
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increased levels of rural debt, and loss of land. This next section then, will examine the 
British-led policies that led to these outcomes. 
C. COMMERCIALIZATION OF INDIA’S MARKETS: ADMINISTRATIVE 
FAILURES 
Upon implementation of its land tenure system, the British also introduced the 
concept of commercial agriculture and monetary tax, which had to be paid regularly and 
on-time. The obligation of the tax required producers to relinquish their harvest, which 
was initially intended for village-wide use. To make payments on time, producers sold 
their harvest in the market. This process led to the emergence of a commercial 
agricultural market, devastating the self-sufficiency of villages as well as interfering with 
cropping patterns.91  
When revenue from commercial sales fell short of the tax obligation, landowning 
peasants sought loans from money-lenders, while others were forced to sell their land. If 
payment was not made, the British installed a civil system that ensured the forced 
extraction of the land.92 Stemming from the commercialization of agriculture, this trend 
entailed the services of both zamindars and jotedars.93 While the role of zamindars has 
been addressed, the function of jotedars is also relevant towards understanding 
Bangladesh’s socio-economic make-up 
Jotedars were those within the village community that owned land, but also lent-
out grain or money to peasants within the community. These well-to-do villagers 
developed a rural credit mechanism in which small farmers became “more indebted than 
the whole value of their stock.”94 In turn, borrowing peasants became beholden to the 
jotedars until (or, if at all) their loans were paid. This debt-based relationship fueled the 
political and economic power of jotedars; however, it was the commercialization of the 
agricultural industry that entrenched the indebted croppers and peasants into poverty. 
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Poor farmers who were unable to transport their goods to the commercial market were 
forced to instantly sell their produce at first harvest, taking the lowest price of the year. 
On the other hand, the buyers were often the jotedars, who had means of storage and 
transportation, and thus were able to wait for prices to increase before selling at a higher 
rate. This pattern of agricultural trade led to significant losses for the poor.95 In these 
ways, British commercialization of agriculture and their tax policies led to increased rates 
of poverty in Bangladesh. 
Another administrative failure that contributed to Bangladesh’s poverty was 
Britain’s ration policy during the great famine of 1943. Within the framework of World 
War II, the blockage of rice imports heading from Japanese occupied Burma worsened as 
the Raj diverted food supplies away from the countryside of Bengal. Instead, grain and 
food provisions were channeled to the city population and military troops stationed in 
Calcutta.96 Furthermore, when the Raj did decide to divert food to Bengal, it was too late 
into the year, which led to food price increases that the rural population could not 
afford.97 This lack of provision further induced hardship under the famine; in turn, these 
instances of divestment led to a decline of rural wages, leading many into destitution.98 
Consequently, the combination of poor policy and man-made famine99 deprived rural 
Bangladesh, further contributing to its historical poverty levels.100  
D. COLONIAL RESOURCE EXTRACTION 
Another historical legacy that has contributed to Bangladesh’s current poverty 
level is the level of resource extraction the nation has experienced, starting with the 
British Raj and continuing under West Pakistan. Centuries before the colonization of 
India, medieval India enjoyed a thriving textile industry, which supplied cotton to the 
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Middle East, Africa and the Far East.101 In turn, this demand for Indian cotton resulted in 
the expansion of Indian textile production, becoming one of the colony’s foremost 
commercial enterprises.102  
The British entered into the cotton manufacturing market only after India had 
established it; however, with their entry, the British also inculcated a practice of import 
substitution that mired India’s long-term prospect. Once Indian imports began flooding 
Britain, the empire tried to industrialize production of cotton in order to develop its own 
capital good industries. There were two facets to their strategy: first British 
manufacturers attempted to improve their spinning technology in order to keep up with 
the quality and price of textiles made in India. Despite attempts to augment their spinning 
technology, the British were not successful in matching India’s quality or price.103 Thus, 
to counter India’s lower prices, England imposed increasingly higher tariffs on Indian 
textiles.104 By 1813, Indian imports into England—still priced competitively and better in 
quality—had import duties of 85 per cent. In turn, these import tariffs hurt foreign 
demand for Indian cotton.105 Had the progressive tariffs not been applied, Indian textile 
manufacturers may have been able to compete with Britain into the 1820s, without the 
need of technological advancements.106 Likewise, by the time Britain further enhanced 
its weaving machinery in the 1840s, India had lost the resources and market share that 
would have allowed it to compete; in turn, India’s textile industry plummeted.107  
Other factors also devastated India’s textile industry. While the East India 
Company exploited India’s trade network, the advent of the Napoleonic Wars led to the 
closure of European ports, making entry of Indian textiles close to impossible. The 
closures adversely affected India because the colony had become dependent upon the 
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European market, with 85% of its textile exports sent into Britain (in turn, Britain 
profited by re-exporting to Europe).108  
Another way in which the textile industry suffered is tied to the land policies 
discussed above. The extraction of cotton revenue by the British, along with their 
extractive appropriation of land revenue, affected domestic demand for India’s main 
industry. While the activities of the East India Company and Raj administration led to an 
accrual of wealth, this wealth was redistributed abroad. Resultantly, resources belonging 
to local rural communities diminished, impoverishing Indian society. The cumulative 
effects of extraction and tax appropriation effectively led to a decline of domestic 
demand, while foreign demand also collapsed as a result of rising prices and the wars.109  
Tied to Britain’s appetite for cotton is the ultimate role commercialization of 
India’s textile sector played in shaping Bangladesh’s current economy. Under colonial 
rule, India’s initial ability to export cotton led to its growing importance in the empire’s 
economy. This drove the process of altering agricultural crops to cotton, effectively 
changing cropping patterns and leading to a “shift away from subsistence production,” 
reducing India’s self-sufficiency.110 In addition, sharecroppers were brought in from 
elsewhere to work these fields, further stressing rural resources and the labor market.111 
A major push for this process came from the American Civil War, which 
motivated the colonial regime to develop schemes that cultivated, transported and 
exported cotton. These requirements resulted in the redistribution of Bengal’s rural labor, 
increasing the number of landless laborers, while enhancing exploitative measures taken 
against sharecropping peasants. This cotton based colonial economy ultimately 
subjugated India’s countryside labor; to cement this subordination, the British regime 
created policy that privileged the zamindars with the power to extract tax payments. In 
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this manner, the zamindari served as a means to entrench extractive elements of the 
commercial process.112  
E. ECONOMIC CHALLENGES BEFORE AND AFTER INDEPENDENCE 
Upon its inception, Bangladesh had suffered both political and economic 
alienation under West Pakistan.113 The causes through which this occurred was based on 
ethnic fragmentation, lack of political and military representation, as well as long term 
resource extraction. In order to further explain why Bangladesh is poor today, it is 
necessary to consider how these post partition dynamics contributed to a legacy of 
poverty within Bangladesh.  
After India received its independence from the British, the state that became West 
and East Pakistan inherited a weak central government. The instability of the era led to 
military takeovers of the state’s administrative institutions. Of significance for East 
Pakistan (now Bangladesh), was the ascent of General Ayub Khan and his army. Under 
Ayub Khan’s 1960s authoritarian regime, the Bengali economic trajectory was 
significantly affected because of the way in which political establishments were set up. 
To begin, Bengalis were under-represented in both the army and bureaucracy.114 In 
effect, this meant that Bengal’s interests were represented only in the margins, if at all. 
This also meant that awareness of Bengal’s poverty was undermined at a time when 
development agencies were being established. During this period, though the regime was 
successful in setting up development projects across Pakistan, the programs were 
asymmetric in their distribution and East Pakistan was continuously neglected.115 Table 1 
demonstrates the level of disparity of development between the two sides of Pakistan: 
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Table 1.   Level of Development Disparity within Pakistan in the 1960s.116 
 
 
The data in Table 1 reflects deliberate neglect of East Pakistan, a notion supported 
by the fact that, while East Pakistan housed 55–60% of Pakistan’s total population,117 
East Pakistan’s share of the Central governments development budget was as low as 
20%.118 The reasons that led to this asymmetric allocation of development funding are 
addressed next. During the Ayub regime, a climate of cultural bias facilitated the 
disparity of growth between West and East Pakistan.119 As such, funding networks 
privileged West Pakistan over those of East Pakistan, as investors either had no interest in 
East Pakistan, or were dissuaded based on pre-existing ethnic fragmentation. Thus, while 
there were a greater number of financial investments available to lead to rapid economic 
growth in the West, the East remained underdeveloped. Over a period of time, economic 
disparity between West and East Pakistan widened, and the two economies developed in 
parallel. This economic difference is illustrated in the Table 2, which highlights the 
overall decline in per capita income of East Pakistan during Ayub’s regime.120 
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Table 2.   Overall Decline in per Capita Income in Pakistan 
under Ayub Regime, 1959–1960121 
 
Prices in rupees.  
 
This pattern of growing disparity was further augmented by the fact that East 
Pakistan’s major jute export market earned the foreign exchange from which West 
Pakistan benefited from. During the Ayub regime, it was common for business earnings 
to be repatriated to the western side of the country, particularly from rice, flour and jute 
mills.122 The jute export industry alone accounted for 43% of total export earnings for 
Pakistan.123 Thus, while profits from these industries were used to build infrastructure 
and fund welfare projects in West Pakistan, East Pakistan was losing resources.124 This 
form of resource extraction served as a policy that maintained East Pakistan’s poverty 
levels. Furthermore, the outcomes of these economic policies were amplified after the 
Pakistan-India war of 1965, which resulted in the disruption of trade links that had 
existed between India and East Pakistan.125 The grievances of East Pakistan that 
accumulated since Pakistan’s Independence would eventually serve as the basis for 
Bangladesh’s own independence movement.126   
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During Bangladesh’s war for independence, revolutionaries and Indian forces 
triumphed against Pakistan, but at a cost. The military strategy used at this time included 
dismantling key infrastructure within East Pakistan to undermine West Pakistani forces. 
This, then, included the destruction of roads, railways, bridges, waterways, ports, and 
powerplants.127 This destruction not only damaged the jute industry, but, at the same 
time, West Pakistan continued to dip into Pakistan’s foreign exchange holding to fund its 
military campaign against the East. Thus, financial reserves for Bangladesh’s future 
quickly disappeared. For example, in March 1970, reserves held were in the amount of 
U.S. $353 million, however, by September 1971, only U.S. $20 million was left. The 
reality worsened as Bengali expatriates, out of fear that their remittances would end up 
being used by West Pakistan’s military, stopped remitting payments to their family 
members in the East. This led remittance payments to drop to a third of their average in 
1971.128 Thus, while this strategy proved successful in countering West Pakistan’s 
military operations, the wartime outcome hindered the “economic prospects of 
independent Bangladesh.”129 
After the war, Bangladesh’s economic standing was faced with setbacks. While 
the reconstruction of infrastructure and export markets proved difficult, the industrial and 
agricultural sectors struggled even further, with productivity falling behind prewar levels. 
Coupled with the international oil shock of 1973, Bangladesh’s economy continued to 
languish.130 The post-independence political environment did not fare much better. After 
the inception of Bangladesh, a series of political assassinations prevented the country 
from reaching a sense of normalcy. This tumultuous environment led to a handful of 
military coups, leading to years of emergency rule, and as a consequence, subverting 
development prospects. These events, then, contributed to the collapse of development 
within Bangladesh and institutionalized poverty within the state and country.131 
                                                 
127 Rachavan, 1971: A Global History, 262. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid., 271. 
131 Ibid. 
 38
F. BANGLADESH’S INDEPENDENCE AND ONWARD: THE EFFECTS OF 
CORRUPTION AND EXTERNAL FACTORS 
Since Bangladesh’s independence in 1971, the nation’s dependence on aid, and 
the subsequent clientelistic behavior that stemmed from this, have thwarted the country’s 
economic stability. Related to this dependence, the nation has also been plagued from 
political turbulence and the dominance of domestic politics by a select few. Meanwhile, 
the nation is a geographic front line for the effects of climate change, reflecting an 
ecological inheritance that limits Bangladesh’s ability to remain self-sufficient, while also 
serving as a primary reason why Bangladesh receives aid. These combined factors have 
left a mark on Bangladesh’s economic livelihood. 
Dependence on foreign aid and the domination of domestic politics by a few elites 
are outcomes stemming from Bangladesh’s formative years. Introducing these factors as 
external linkages, Rehman Sobhan states that these links facilitated the eventual demise 
of Bangladesh’s economy.132 Sobhan contends that the summation of foreign aid 
dependence and the elite’s political monopolization led to the advent of a Bangladeshi 
bourgeoisie, a class whose entire fortune became linked to external resources intended for 
development projects within Bangladesh.133 What came out of this was plundering 
behavior, which entailed the bourgeoisie circumventing the flow of development funding 
in efforts to sustain their personal wealth. As a result, not only did unequal distribution of 
wealth become a problem, but the nation as a whole was prevented from experiencing 
reproductive growth. Consequently, the bourgeoisie ensured that the public was kept 
away from the productive process, as public involvement threatened the elite’s economic 
livelihood.134 
Bangladesh’s access to aid has increased since the nation’s inception, with 
justification based on its politics, history, and geography.135 These geo-political 
inheritances are, in part, the result of becoming an independent nation state of Pakistan: 
                                                 





after independence, Bangladesh inherited 10 million refugees who had been displaced or 
who had left during the war.136 In addition, East Pakistan’s development history (i.e lack 
of irrigation systems) and its geography, made it so that its soil was hardly cultivatable, 
while only a few natural resources were left to extract from. As indicated earlier, 
Bangladesh’s export surplus had been diverted to fund the development of West Pakistan, 
creating a devastating starting point from which Bangladesh could build infrastructure 
and develop social programs.137 The significance of its poverty level is exemplified in the 
fact that, three years after independence, the nation had only $140 million to its name.138 
Thus, bureaucratic dependence on aid, coupled with constrained development capacity as 
a result of its diminished reserves, conditioned Bangladesh to depend on outside 
assistance. 
Bangladesh’s dependence dynamic is further illustrated by the fact that, as a result 
of the war, the number and proportion of landless Bengali’s increased, as did 
Bangladesh’s dependency on food. Reliance on aid deepened as the nation’s revenue gap, 
savings gap, and foreign exchange gap grew. In the long-term, Bangladesh’s inability to 
capture internal resources deteriorated as political constraints prevented the state’s ability 
to expand its domestic reserves. Meanwhile, bureaucratic elites responsible for 
channeling aid into the economy used the funding to enhance their own material and 
political means. Thus, conditions within Bangladesh deteriorated as plundering of foreign 
funding led to corruption.139 In these ways, the social engineering of Bangladesh’s 
independence entrenched the nation’s poverty.140 
In addition, the post 1971 political environment—riddled with confrontational 
politics, violence, and clientelism—further destabilized Bangladesh’s economy. To 
begin, a social order of clientelism dominated political institutions, facilitating the 
proliferation of an illiberal democracy that lacked the capacity (and desire) to restore 
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order. The precedent that had been set during the colonial era and rule under Pakistan was 
a patron-client system that was “distant and top-down in character.”141 In addition, this 
tradition carried over into Bangladesh because only a few elite had been allowed to lead 
the initial political process. Further destabilizing the political arena was the fact that those 
who had experience running political institutions left Bangladesh after the 1971 war, as 
their bases were back in West Pakistan. This exodus of leadership created a political 
vacuum that led to a power-grab, and an outcome of this competition, then, was the 
development of class-based political relationships.142 
Without the existence of any political foundation, Bangladesh’s post war history 
began with the confrontational rise of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who emerged as a 
revolutionary hero out of the 1971 war. Serving as Bangladesh’s first Prime Minister, 
Rahman was armed with little political leadership experience; however, he and his party, 
the Awami League (AL), were faced with a host of challenges. Not only were these 
challenges in the form of colonial era legacies, but the leadership also had to establish 
law and order, repatriate armed freedom fighters, rebuild the infrastructure that was 
destroyed during the war, as well as improve the infrastructure that was limited to begin 
with. As leaders of a new nation, the AL was also responsible for instilling a sense of 
national unity. Just as important, however, this was a critical time for the political party to 
formulate policies that would address Bangladesh’s economic needs.143 
As a resistance leader, Mujib had shown himself to be capable; however, he and 
his party were not able to deliver effective leadership that addressed the above 
challenges. Within his appointment, the practice of clientelism became rampant, with AL 
representatives placing “its own leadership and party interests before those of the state, 
setting a strong precedent for Bangladesh’s future pattern of ‘politics of patronage.’”144 
As a result, rival claims on state resources grew, as competing patronage networks 
became the modus operandi. Another consequential outcome of this practice was a 
                                                 
141 Lewis, Bangladesh, 76. 
142 Ibid., 77. 
143 Ibid., 76–77. 
144 Ibid., 77. 
 41
precedent of weak accountability and responsibility, a phenomenon further stemming 
from the absence of political minority groups that could voice opposition. The lack of an 
established press, courts and political opposition cemented the power of political 
patronage networks.145 In turn, these factors blunted the state’s capacity to formulate and 
implement effective policy, opening the door for the plundering of state resources.146 
The corruption and instability within Bangladesh’s political leadership triggered 
disaffection within Bangladesh’s army. In August 1975, army officers assassinated 
Mujib, establishing the pattern for a series of violent military coups.147 General Ziaur 
Rahman took power in 1976, and was assassinated in May 1981. After his death, a 
general election resulted in the majority appointment of Justice Abdul Sattar as president. 
However, the political system was still struggling, and after a several months, General 
H.M. Ershad raised a bloodless coup, rising to power by March 1982.148 Due to these 
rapid changes in political power, the first decade of Bangladesh’s history witnessed a 
massive disruption in security. Meanwhile, the first three leaders were removed while 
state policy was still forming. As a response to this, protest politics arose within 
Bangladesh, with one leader heading such a campaign being General Ziaur Rahman’s 
widow, Mrs. Khaleda Zia; while another was Sheikh Hasina Wazed, leader of AL as well 
as Mujib’s daughter.149  
Emerging as popular opposition leaders, Begum Zia and Sheikh Hasina offered 
Bangladeshi voters political alternatives to military rule. One outcome of their lobbying 
for the removal of military rule was a rise of a broad-based people’s movement within 
Bangladesh, which included mobilizing students, workers and opposition parties to call to 
an end of Ershad’s regime. After Ershad was eventually removed from power in 1990, 
Begum Khaleda won democratic election in 1991 under the Bangladesh Nationalist Party 
(BNP). Her administration implemented new rules of foreign investment, which 
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encouraged outside ownership of industrial companies. Meanwhile, foreign exchange 
restrictions were lifted and new export-tax exemptions were implemented in order to 
support the garment industry. This momentum was further propelled by the fact that the 
U.S. government wrote off almost one-third of Bangladesh’s debt. These 
implementations led to a degree of optimism for Bangladesh’s economy; however, 
confrontational politics got the better of the ruling regime and the BNP’s main 
opposition, the AL, began accusing the party of vote rigging, triggering street protests 
and stoppages.150  
By March 1996, the protests and stoppages had led to complete disruption of the 
BNP’s power. This interruption, brokered primarily by a civil society group known as the 
Federation of Bangladesh Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FBCCI), was also an 
effort backed by civil servants, trade unions, NGO’s, journalists and lawyers—all seeking 
the institutionalization of a caretaker government and a call for new elections. Begum Zia 
eventually obliged, and in June 1996, Sheikh Hasina’s AL party came to power.151  
Despite being democratically elected, Bangladesh’s parliament continued to be 
boycotted by the BNP opposition, which argued that the AL (along with hits ally Jatiya 
Party) was “abusing its majority to prevent discussion of important national issues.”152 
Though the political climate was still riddled with a lack of unity, the Hasina 
administration was able to implement an increase in Bangladesh’s food-grain production, 
initiate a water-sharing treaty and establish the CHT Peace Accord of December 1997 
with India; as well as build a large-scale. Despite these advances, the government was 
consumed with claiming the past glory of Bangladesh’s independence, and the AL 
government was accused of corruption and inefficiency.153  
Between 2001 and 2009, both Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina battled for political 
power; meanwhile, Bangladesh’s political unity experienced further fragmentation with 
the introduction of religious-based political parties, the existence of paramilitary 
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members committing human rights violations, and episodes of military intervention of the 
government. These factors led to further political destabilization of the institutions 
responsible for forming Bangladesh’s economic policy.154 Thus, Bangladesh’s inability 
to conduct “nation-building” and “state-building” activities facilitated the demise of its 
economy.155 The nation’s political history demonstrates how elites failed in “maintaining 
law and order, creating [an] efficient administrative capacity, and guiding the economy in 
favor” of constructive policy.156 These practices have kept the political institutions of 
Bangladesh weak, further leading to the nation’s reliance on development aid.157 
G. GEOGRAPHICAL CHALLENGES 
Finally, Bangladesh’s geography contributes to its poverty. A series of floods and 
cyclones, beginning in 1970 and repeatedly appearing over the course of the next twenty 
years, have plagued Bangladesh. Not only have thousands of people lost their lives, but 
several hundred thousand are left without shelter during each episode. The widespread 
damage that arises from natural disasters not only hurts Bangladesh’s agricultural 
industry, but infrastructure is left crippled, with the 1988 monsoon flooding “wiping out 
10% of Bangladesh’s agricultural alone.”158 Furthermore, as addressed previously, 
historical precedent shows that aid meant to rehabilitate Bangladesh after such disasters is 
often plundered. In these ways geographically based factors have contributed to 
Bangladesh’s poverty. 
H. CONCLUSION 
This chapter surveyed the causes of Bangladesh’s poverty. Beginning with the 
exogenous factor of Britain’s tax extraction policy, Bangladesh’s rural population lost 
economic and political autonomy. In turn, this pattern led to a shift in incentives and 
purchasing power, reducing the breadth of population able and willing to invest in 
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agricultural development. At the same time, the British administration created civil law 
that gave zamindars power to extract the maximum level of taxes from the peasantry; 
such pressure led to peasants lobbying around land reform issues, which led to the 
neglect of public goods. In this way, land policies shaped the political environment that 
has promoted unequal wealth distribution and poverty in Bangladesh.    
Another outcome of land policies that contributed to Bangladesh’s poverty was 
the commercialization of Bangladesh’s agriculture. Both peasants and landed elite were 
responsible for paying monetary taxes that were tied to a rigid payment schedule. The 
poor had difficulty in paying these dues because their flow of income was slower than the 
tax payment schedule. Adding to the difficulty of peasants was the lack transport that 
could enable the poor to bring their goods to market. In addition, farmers lacked the 
financial savings that would allow them to stock their harvest until they could sell at 
market value, which necessitated the sale of goods below market price. As a 
consequence, tax payments and commercial losses led to increased debt amongst the 
peasant class, which resulted in the forced sale or extraction of land within the rural 
population. 
Tied to forced commercialization of Bangladesh’s agriculture is Britain’s 
interference in India’s cotton industry. Once a thriving domestic and international market, 
British exportation policies led to the demise of India’s textile market, which was 
challenged with progressively higher tariff rates and increased competition from copy-cat 
British manufacturers. This process also entailed shifts in cropping patterns and land 
usage, which deprived India’s farmers of self-sufficiency. These administrative policies 
further led to the decline of domestic and foreign demand for India’s textiles, crippling 
one of its primary industries. 
Furthermore, extraction at the hands of the ruling authority continued during 
Bangladesh’s history as East Pakistan. As addressed previously, Ayub Khan’s regime 
purged East Pakistan of its wealth. After the 1971 war, with its major jute industry 
shattered and its foreign exchange reserves squandered, Bangladesh faced severe 
economic challenges. Furthermore, the nation’s infrastructure, power facilities and public 
institutions were destroyed. These circumstances left the infant state very little financial 
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resources from which development could be funded; moreover, its leadership—enthralled 
in internal competition and corruption—lacked the means to develop and implement 
productive policy.  
During its formative years, the international community acknowledged 
Bangladesh’s challenges, prompting the flow of development aid. Despite the 
opportunity, elites and politicians found it lucrative to plunder from the state’s aid 
resources, leading to the perpetuation of clientelism. Simultaneously, Bangladesh’s 
geographic location made the nation vulnerable to a host of natural disasters. This fixed 
ecological inheritance has continuously devastated the country, creating a pattern of aid 
dependence and corruption. In turn, the focus of political parties remained “how to stay” 
in power, and was less about how to build the state. In these ways, a historically weak 
central government and the prevalence of corruption plagued Bangladesh, hindering the 
state’s capacity to improve the nation’s economic standing. Hence, a combination of 
policy, war and geography created a legacy of poverty within Bangladesh. 
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V. POVERTY REDUCTION AND OTHER OUTCOMES OF 
MICROFINANCE PROGRAMS IN BANGLADESH 
Chapter V begins by addressing the origins of microfinance in Bangladesh, the 
intent of its creation, and defines what microcredit is. The succeeding section B then 
introduces quantitative field research that measures the income performance of rural 
borrowers working with Bangladesh’s largest microlenders, while the following section 
offers an analysis of the economic spillover effects, particularly with regards to savings, 
followed by a discussion of consumption smoothing. Section C is an analysis that 
addresses non-economic outcomes of microcredit, including political impacts and self-
efficacy, and the development of social trust. The subsequent sections then turn to 
analyzing the effect borrowing from MFIs has had on women’s empowerment. The final 
section of Chapter V, section G, conveys innovative features that set microcredit 
programs apart from commercial loans, and seeks to address if these mechanisms make 
microcredit more positive towards its mission. 
A. MICROFINANCE BACKGROUND 
Muhammad Yunus, the founder of Bangladesh’s Grameen Bank, developed the 
concept of microfinance as a tool to mitigate levels of local poverty, with the intent of 
providing loans to individuals who are unable to secure credit from formal institutions.159 
He wanted for the rural poor to be able to pull themselves out of the “poverty trap,”160 
which he believes is exacerbated by the formal banking sector ignoring the 
underprivileged.161 This chapter analyzes specific outcomes that have evolved out of 
microfinance programs in Bangladesh—emphasizing especially the role of MFIs in 
increasing income for the poor. As suggested in chapter one, microfinance is not a 
“catch-all” silver bullet with regards to alleviating poverty, however, it can—to a limited 
extent—augment income levels for poor households.  
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Despite this small relative change, there are considerable additional spillover 
effects of microfinance, which this chapter surveys. The first section of this chapter 
considers the intent of microfinance. The second section presents empirical data from the 
three largest microfinance organizations in Bangladesh, and establishes the extent to 
which these programs affect village poverty levels. The third section will draw on aspects 
of behavioral economics to provide a connection between borrowing and saving, and 
borrowing and consumption. Section four reflects on the spillover effects of microloans, 
indicating how the nature of microfinance programs enable increased access to 
information, thereby facilitating social capital and development. The fifth section will 
treat gender-based lending as a separate facet of microlending, and will analyze the 
impact of microcredit on women. Section six will then consider innovative features of 
microfinance to highlight the conditions under which microfinance is fruitful, focusing on 
targeting female borrowers and group lending dynamics. 
B. MICROFINANCE: THE INTENT AND THOSE IT SERVES 
Despite the level of poverty within Bangladesh, its 169 million-person population 
remains one of the country’s primary assets.162 As a response to its poverty level and size 
of its population, Bangladesh has become a testing ground for NGOs interested in trying 
new credit-based development strategies. Furthermore, the idea of civil society has 
shaped the way in which organizations perceive their role within Bangladesh.163 So much 
so, that by 2005, a World Bank study cited the presence of 206,000 “not-for-profit” 
organizations within the country, with 90% of NGO field offices reporting that they 
provide some form of credit provision.164 The World Bank further concludes that the 
NGO sector makes up 6 to 8% of Bangladesh’s annual GDP that year.165 The table below 
depicts the capacity at which microfinance institutions have captured credit markets: as of 
2007, the three major microlending institutions in Bangladesh–—Grameen Bank, the 
Association for Social Advancement (ASA), and the Bangladesh Rural Advancement 
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Committee (BRAC)—have captured a combined market share of 20 million 
borrowers.166 This growing figure provides hope that microfinance can—among other 
things—reach the poor to facilitate poverty reduction. See Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Growth in Grameen Bank Membership, 1967–2007.167 
Before addressing the outcomes of microfinance, it is beneficial to revisit the 
definition this study is referencing: “small scale transactions in credit savings designed to 
meet the needs of small and medium-scale producers and businesses.”168 In addition, the 
characteristics of microloans can vary. The amount of the loan is one such example, with 
the dollar amount ranging from U.S. $5 all the way to U.S. $10,000.169 Meanwhile, the 
maturity dates of these loans are relatively shorter than formal loans, with many loans 
maturing within a year. In some cases, repayment is expected daily. In order to cover the 
costs associated with these services, the interest rates of these programs can be higher 
than those rates within the formal sector, but still lower than the rates offered by informal 
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moneylenders.170 Despite the high interest rates, the loan repayment ratio for the 
Grameen Bank is reported to be 97%,171 while BRAC’s was 98% and ASA’s 99% in 
2000;172 these figures convey that microcredit institutions claim lower losses than do 
formal banks of developed countries.173 This low delinquency rate is credited to the lack 
of alternative opportunities that are available to the poor.174 According to Muhammad 
Yunus: 
The poor know that this credit is their only opportunity to break out of 
poverty. They do not have any cushion whatsoever to fall back on. If they 
fall afoul of this one loan, they will have lost their one and only chance to 
get out of the rut.175 
Thus, microfinance is a response to the demand for loans that support 
entrepreneurship among the poor. In this way, it differs from other transfer schemes, in 
that it entails self-sufficiency as well as favorable market conditions.176 In addition, 
microcredit institutions specifically generate opportunities for the poor. Thus, since the 
1970s, the poor in Bangladesh have garnered interest in securing access to credit.177 
Today, Bangladesh houses 686 microfinance organizations.178 Generally, these 
microcredit organizations receive financial support from the World Bank, donors in the 
West, and other NGOs or commercial lenders, who often lend at below market rates.179 
In turn, microfinance establishments offer credit schemes to poor borrowers or small 
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companies.180 In addition to providing loans, microfinance institutions offer other 
valuable services. This includes offering skill-based training for jobs,181 agricultural 
development, health and educational services, while also offering “rural community 
organizing”182 along with “consciousness-raising training to empower the poor.”183 
1. The Economic Impact of Microloans at the Village Level  
Over the last thirty years, analysts have begun compiling data to assess if 
microfinance or microcredit programs have been successful in combating poverty. This 
section surveys particular assessments that have tracked Bangladesh’s largest 
microfinance programs: Grameen, Association for Social Advancement (ASA), and the 
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC). Given the scope of their recipient 
base, this analysis will focus on income generation of village-level borrowing households 
to track if microfinance is effective toward combating extreme and moderate poverty 
levels. 
Empirical assessments conducted by Shahidur Khandker and Mark Pitt find 
substantial net reductions of moderate poverty for borrowers of microfinance programs. 
In addition, these programs benefit non-borrowers as well. Khandker and Pitt compiled 
World Bank data from 1991/92 and 1998/99 to assess the impact of microloans, covering 
1,798 households across 87 villages, incorporating eight randomly selected thana’s that 
were canvassed by BRAC, Grameen Bank, and the Bangladesh Rural Developments 
Board’s Rural Development; while also selecting five additional non-program thana’s.184 
Their “data on consumption and the consumption poverty line showed that moderate 
poverty in the sample villages declined overall by 17 percentage points between 1991/92 
and 1998/99 and extreme poverty by 13 percentage points.”185 For those areas that had a 
microfinance program offered (non-borrowing samples were taken out of the survey), the 
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moderate poverty levels dropped approximately 18%; meanwhile, after year one, between 
1991/92, borrowers living in non-program areas also experienced a 19% reduction in 
poverty.186 
Over the seven year timeframe, the data collected reflects a per year poverty level 
decrease of 3%, with a total decline of 20% between year one and year seven. When 
broken down even further, taking into account household level marginal impact and per 
capita expenditure of nonparticipants,187 Khandker and Pitt find that moderate poverty 
fell by 1.6% annually, while extreme poverty levels fell by 2.2% annually.188 
Furthermore, they conclude that more than half of the 3% annual decrease of moderate 
level poverty is the direct result of microfinance schemes. Looking at the larger picture, 
the aggregate decline in moderate poverty caused by microfinance was about 1%, while 
extreme poverty levels fell a bit more at 1.3%.189 These figures illustrate the way in 
which microfinance, as a whole, has led to an overall decline of moderate poverty in rural 
Bangladesh by 40%.190 
M. Jahangir Chowdhury conducted a similar study across 205 village households 
in Bangladesh, which included a random sampling of comparison non-borrowing 
households and randomly selected households who were part of a Grameen program.191 
These Grameen program members were further grouped on the basis of their length of 
time in a particular program, ranging from 2–4 years, 5–7 years and 8 years or greater. 
Chowdhury based the poverty line on the cost of a minimum 2,112 calorie diet that 
includes 58 grams of protein—food intake amounts deemed necessary to lead a 
productive lifestyle for an adult male. If the weekly cost of such a diet for an adult male 
of a household falls below147 taka, the household is considered poor. Based on the 
relationship between calories and household expenditure, empirical data demonstrates 
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that the number of households reporting to live at the poverty level decreased the most 
for those who were in the program for longer periods of time, with the percentage of 
households in poverty going from 55.56% to 47.44% for those in a program between 2–4 
years. For the second group, those households borrowing between 5–7 years, poverty 
level households started at 59.17% but fell to 40.83%. Meanwhile, the third group—
households in a program for a minimum of 8 years—experienced a change in poverty 
status as well, starting at 61.54% and falling to 38.46%. The comparison group had a 
poor household to non-poor household ratio of 64.47 to 35.53%. Despite the promising 
data, Chowdhury finds that the poverty alleviation for program members began to taper 
off after a duration of 5 years. Nonetheless, Chowdhury’s overall findings conclude that 
the variation in poverty status between Grameen program households and the non-
borrowing comparison group reflects how microfinance can decrease village level 
poverty for borrowing customers, while such alleviation is enhanced with the “increase of 
microcredit program membership and the duration and microcredit loan size.”192 See 
Table 3. 
Table 3.   Distribution of Poverty Status of Program Households and 
Comparison by Membership Duration (Bangladesh).193 
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Number of Households %
Comparison Group 127 64.47
Program Groups
12-48 Months 37 44.44
49-84 Months 49 40.83
85-Above Months 40 38.46
Poor
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Jahangir Chowdhury, Dipak Gosh and Robert Wright conducted another 
experiment in 1999 to evaluate microcredit impacts at the village level. Sampling 909 
village households, this study randomly selected borrowers from Grameen, BRAC and 
ASA. These households were indiscriminately selected based on geographic branches, 
and then grouped based on duration of membership, which included less than 2 years, 2 
to 4 years, 5–7 years, and 8 years and above. Placing particular focus on the impact of 
duration within a program, the researchers measured results against two poverty lines. 
The first was an objective poverty line, which is based on the cost necessary to maintain 
the standardized 2,112 calorie diet that was referenced previously.194 The second was 
subjective, as “a household was defined as being poor if the household head answered 
‘yes’ to the following question: ‘Do you consider your family poor based on your current 
yearly income?’”195 See Table 4 and Figure 2.  
Table 4.   Objective and Subjective Poverty Rates.196 
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Sample N Objective Poverty (%) Subjective Poverty (%)
'New' members
Loan not received 45 68.9 86.7
Duration <1 year 220 55.3 90.9
Subtotal: 265 65.3 90.2
'Old' members
Duration 1-2 years 103 55.3 64.1
Duration 2-4 years 214 54.2 52.3
Duration 5-7 years 300 46.3 39.0
Duration 8+ years 27 40.7 48.1
Subtotal: 644 50.2 47.9
TOTAL: 909 54.6 60.2
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Figure 2.  Program Duration and Objective Poverty.197 
The statistical analysis conducted by Chowdhury, Gosh and Wright finds that 
both objective and subjective poverty rates decreased as the duration of program 
membership increased, with objective poverty rates falling 2.5% per program year; while 
subjective poverty declined by approximately 6.5% per program year. Meanwhile, 
“newer” members experienced higher objective poverty than “old” members, surveying 
at 65.3% poverty and 50.2% poverty, respectively. Similarly, the subjective poverty rate 
of new members was higher at 90.2%, while 47.9% of veteran borrowers stated they were 
living in poverty. With regards to the tapering off of poverty alleviation effects, 
Chowdhury, Gosh and Wright reached a conclusion similar to Chowdhury’s earlier 
survey, finding that poverty alleviation leveled off after about six years into a program, 
while objective and subjective poverty rates were still relatively high by year 8 at 45%.198 
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2. Microfinance Allows the Poor to Save Money: Explained by 
Behavioral Economics 
Microfinance advocates contend that small credit programs for the poor facilitate 
poverty reduction by allowing borrowers to save. Traditionally, the poor afford major 
investments by pulling funds from savings, selling assets or borrowing from informal 
networks. Microcredit allows the poor to borrow instead and thereby invest without 
having to jeopardize their savings. This notion is supported by studies of behavioral 
economics, which reflect that individuals are more willing to borrow than to dip into their 
savings.199 Banerjee relates conditions that support this, contending that saving is 
difficult in the first place because the “human brain processes the present and the future 
very differently,” as humans “buy what we want today [while we] plan to [spend] money 
in more responsible ways tomorrow.”200 Karlan and Appel suggest this is the case 
because money is fungible—meaning that it gets spent one way or another before making 
it into a savings account,201 citing an example of an indebted man named Philip who 
buys a rice cooker as soon as he has paid a certain level of debt (though not all), because, 
in his mind, “his debt had ceased to be the deepest hole.”202 Under this context, 
microfinance allows for borrowing to complement saving. Moreover, securing credit 
enables the poor to save to a greater extent than they would otherwise, as weak self-
control inhibits commitment to saving. Microloans make this possible because 
mechanisms such as Grameen’s “structured savings accounts” require regular and timely 
fixed deposits, hedging against poor spending habits and serving as a form of insurance, 
promoting long-term welfare of borrowing clients.203 
The savings feature of particular microfinance programs help the poor save in 
greater quantities, as well as provides an effective way to hold onto wealth, enabling a 
major investment to take place in the future. Rather than drawing against savings to 
                                                 
199 Armendariz and Murdoch, The Economics of Microfinance, 16. 
200 Banerjee and Duflo, Poor Economics, 194, 195. 
201 Dean Karlan and Jacob Appel, More than Good Intentions (New York: Penguin Group, 2011) 100. 
202 Karlan and Appel, More than Good Intentions, 104. 
203 Armendariz and Murdoch, The Economics of Microfinance, 16–17. 
 57
address immediate needs, loans provide an alternative that guards a poor person’s future 
income. In this way, both saving and borrowing alleviate long-term poverty levels. For 
example, microlender Shakti Foundation for Women, a Bangladesh-based bank modeled 
after Grameen, requires savings in the form of a 5% group tax on the loan principal, 
while requiring a weekly deposit of 10 taka (approximately 20 cents). Half of this weekly 
deposit is channeled into a personal account, while the other goes into a central fund. 
Within this structure, the individual account can be drawn upon at any time; however, the 
central account can only be accessed after a minimum of five years, and only if the 
borrower is leaving the program. This feature is intended to condition discipline in 
saving,204 and has proven particularly beneficial for female account holders; meanwhile, 
empirical evidence points to actual improvement in the livelihood of female borrowers 
who contribute to this form of savings plan. Borrowing from a similar loan model 
facilitated in Kenya in 2006 and 2007, analysts find that female account holders with the 
Grameen based approach “increased [their] average daily productive investment by about 
40 percent.”205 
Furthermore, the savings that are fostered by microloan programs are of particular 
relevance to nuclear households within Bangladesh, which include multiple generations 
living in one household. Multigenerational households traditionally have low levels of 
savings since the transfer of income and wealth transfer from one generation to the next, 
presenting little motivation to save. However, problems arise as young families split off 
to form their own household. Under this context, savings plans become more important. 
To address this, Grameen has a scheme called the Grameen Pension Scheme, which, 
despite the name, allows any borrower holding a minimum loan amount of 8,000 taka 
(138 dollars) to deposit at least 50 taka (86 cents) per month. If held for 10 years, the 
bank will pay compound interest at a rate of 12% per year. Both Grameen and ASA have 
additional savings schemes that cater to shorter-term holdings. All of these savings plans, 
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however, have features of low minimum payments, monthly due dates and a minimum 
time required which further instill a commitment to saving.206 
3. Other Economic Outcomes of Microfinance: Consumption Raising 
and Smoothing 
Microfinance is also thought to encourage “consumption smoothing,” whereby 
households can attempt to maintain relatively constant spending and living standards 
even though earning and other income streams are not linear. Similarly, levels of 
borrowing allow the poor to survive income shocks while protecting their savings. These 
savings, then, allow the poor to hedge against future risk, whether that be due to 
deteriorating health or instances that result in income loss.207 
The Khandker and Pitt study referenced above examines the relationship between 
microfinance borrowing, income, consumption, and savings. Data extracted from 
borrowing households between years 1991/92 and 1998/99 found that, over the seven 
year timeframe, “total household annual per capita expenditures grew by 34.6 percent 
over”208 for participating borrowers. This equates to a real expenditure increase of 
approximately 5% annually for program participants, reflecting long-term raised 
consumption. 
In addition, Khandker and Pitt find that credit obtained by households within a 
village has positive influence over per capita expenditure of households, both in terms of 
direct effect on borrowers, and spillover effects on non-borrowers living within the same 
village.209 For example, panel data isolating individual borrowers finds that “a 10 percent 
increase in women’s individual current borrowing increases [their] household’s per capita 
expenditure by 0.06 percent,” while finding that men’s borrowing has “no such 
effects.”210 Meanwhile, panel data extracted for the village as a whole reflects that “a 10 
percent increase in the village average of women’s current borrowing from microfinance 
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programs increases household per capita total expenditure by 0.68 percent, food 
expenditure by 0.50 percent, and nonfood expenditure by 0.97 percent.”211 Thus, with 
regards to outcomes, microfinance leads to an increased standard of living, in that it 
provides for increased calorie consumption within households while allowing for greater 
consumption of non-food items. A finding for further research is that consumption 
increase as a consequence of microfinance is more prevalent amongst female borrowers 
than male borrowers.212  
Subsequently, increased consumption levels also lead to positive village level 
spillover effects. As indicated in the Khandker and Pitt study, village-level spillover 
outcomes of microfinance transfer income to non-borrowers as well. However, the 
income that transfers correlates with the amount of credit acquired by all borrowing 
village residents.213 This is supported by the same panel data, which demonstrates that, 
for a 20 household village community, a 10% growth in borrowing—while leading to a 
direct 0.06% increase in per capita expenditure for borrowers—also equated to 0.034% 
per capita expenditure increase for non-borrowers.214  
4. Assessment of the Economic Impact of Micro-Lending on Poverty 
Reduction at the Village Level 
Furthermore, there is a linear relationship between reduced objective poverty and 
the duration of time participants have been within a particular microcredit program. Put 
simply, participants are better off the longer they are part of a program; however, there is 
a point when the momentum of income generation tapers off. This trend suggests micro-
lenders need to consider additional schemes that help sustain prolonged economic 
benefits to borrower households. 
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C. NON-ECONOMIC SPILLOVER EFFECTS OF MICROFINANCE: 
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
1. Political Impact and Self-Efficacy 
This section analyzes some of the major spillover effects of microcredit programs 
to convey how microcredit programs are successful. These effects include political 
outcomes that result from borrowing, such as increased political activism and self-
efficacy. 
Oksan Bayulgen makes the argument, for example, that microcredit can increase 
the level of political empowerment that is felt by borrowers. The World Bank defines 
empowerment as “the process of increasing the assets and capabilities of individuals or 
groups to make purposive choices and to transform those choices into desired actions and 
outcomes.”215 Under this framework, Bayulgen contends that the empowerment 
cultivated through microfinance allows the borrowing poor to make political decisions 
and gives them agency to act on these decisions, leading to overall outcomes of political 
knowledge and political participation.216 As a result, the poor are more equipped to 
influence the course of their livelihoods, and more capable of making communal 
decisions that affect their society at large.217 Political knowledge, or access to 
information, considers the level of information one has on public goods and services that 
are accessible to the community, the extent to which elected politicians are making good 
on promises of those goods and services, and the rights available to citizens that can be 
used to hold politicians accountable.218 
The second factor that can measure political empowerment is the level of 
participation. Traditionally, poor individuals and other marginalized groups have not 
participated in political agenda building. However, when empowered, they not only have 
increased awareness (due to the awareness building agendas of microlenders), but they 
also have gained greater appreciation of involving themselves in decision-making. While 
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this includes voting, there are further reaching elements as well. These elements include 
“participation in community organizations, campaigning, contacting, petitioning, 
protesting, litigating and unionizing.”219 Microfinance, then, allows for political 
empowerment outcomes to occur. There are two mechanisms for this causal chain. First, 
assuming microfinance enhances the monetary and social status of the poor, as a 
consequence, the poor’s empowerment increases, because their sense of self, or “self-
efficacy” has improved. In addition, microfinance, through enhancing social capital 
within communities, improves individual access to information—including political 
agendas—which compels the poor to participate in the political arena.220 Under such 
conditions, then, microfinance allows for increased political empowerment. Field 
experiments conducted by Mohsin Habib and Christine Jubb support Bayulgen’s theory 
about the impact of political empowerment and increased self-efficacy with regards to 
political participation, particularly with regards to voter turnout. Habib and Jubb 
conducted a poll across 64 poor rural districts in Bangladesh, interviewing a volunteer 
based random sample, including 198 ASA members, and another voluntary random 
sample of 99 non-MFI members. All of the interviewing participants were female, as 
99.99% of ASA’s membership is made of women. Habib and Jubb’s study finds that 98% 
of the ASA group voted in the last national election, compared to 81% of the non-MFI 
group. Moreover, the MFI group expects significantly more from the candidate they 
voted for, based on the response that 46% voted because of an expectation that the 
“candidate will bring economic prosperity”221 while 63% said they voted based on their 
individual preferences (versus outside influence). In contrast, 47% of the non-MFI group 
state that their vote was influenced by pressure from local leaders, while only 13% of 
MFI members of the same district feel external pressure. Relatedly, there was no report of 
NGO affiliated pressure to vote in a particular way. These results demonstrate self-
efficacy at work; however, Habib and Jubb also find MFI based influence on political 
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empowerment, as 25% of MFI members have an affiliation with a political party, while 
only 13% of the non-MFI group is involved with a political party. These figures illustrate 
Bayulgen’s theory of how increased MFI involvement brings about heightened 
awareness, which compels individuals to partake in the political reform process in greater 
numbers, enabling the development of a civil society. 
Bayulgen further suggests that increased self-efficacy correlates with 
socioeconomic status. For the intent of this discussion, self-efficacy is described as “the 
belief in one’s own efforts to control desired outcomes, as opposed to luck or influence of 
others.”222 By enhancing the socioeconomic standing of its borrowers, microfinance 
raises self-esteem levels and eventually self-realization. These outcomes are further 
facilitated by increased standards of living (such standards were indicated earlier under 
outcomes of consumption smoothing). At this point, borrowers are able to focus on their 
environment instead of their survival. In doing so, they are better equipped to confront 
actors responsible for the wellbeing of their community. Effectively, these individuals 
now see themselves as participants in the political realm. This too, may be contributed by 
the fact that they now know they have either more to gain, or more to lose, if they do not 
participate. In this way, microfinance leads borrowers to experience notions of self-
efficacy and this transfers into the political participation process.223 
The NGO credit provider Proshika is evidence of a microfinance program that is 
facilitating political empowerment and notions of self-efficacy amongst its landless 
clientele. As one of the largest microlenders in Bangladesh, Proshika launched a program 
called Institute for Development Policy Analysis and Advocacy (IDPAA). This institute 
“campaign[s] widely on a variety of social, political and environmental issues.”224 
IDPAA leaders themselves work to promote the “landless group members as candidates 
in local elections.”225 Though this institute meets resistance from local landlords who 
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oppose changes that will affect their own land-related conflicts, its work provides 
evidence of the way in which credit providers such as Proshika are challenging norms.  
Among its services, Proshika has a “Small Economic Enterprise Development,” 
program that supports entrepreneurial schemes across impoverished areas of Bangladesh. 
Evidence of such efforts working includes the example of a beekeeper named Shawkat 
Khan, who started with two hives from Proshika in 1995, and now has 850 beehives to 
support a 18 employee business that exports honey to various countries, not to mention 
having a website that takes international orders.226 Moreover, Proshika is empowering 
from other spectrums as well- with increased income and ties to his community, Shawkat 
now has more reason to involve himself at the local community level. For those like him, 
Proshika offers the “People’s Organization Building Program,” which teaches and 
encourages groups to form federations in order to build broad networks, with some 
members successfully entering politics at the elected federation level.227 Consequently, 
Proshika members are more actively engaged in their community and politics then MFI 
members that do not have targeted focus on political activism, such as BRAC.228 By first 
promoting economic training and then advocating literacy and political awareness, 
Proshika and similar MFI’s are effecting political and social change in Bangladesh’s rural 
areas.229 
2. Social Capital  
In addition to individual empowerment, microfinance can also inculcate shared 
levels of political empowerment by generating social capital. While there is a range of 
definitions used to describe social capital, the most widely used definition emphasizes the 
“features of social organization, such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the 
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efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.”230 Microcredit programs make 
this possible specifically because of their group lending dynamic: in Bangladesh, self-
selected groups made up of 3–10 individuals within a network apply for a single line of 
credit.231 
This form of interdependency motivates each individual to ensure he or she 
prospers, as the premise of such networks is building and maintaining reputations within 
the community.232 
Examples of spillover effects with regards to communal behavior are evident 
through group formations, especially for women. Karlan and Appel cite an example of an 
all-female group in Ghana, who had progressively borrowed a dozen loans in order to run 
and manage a theatre, taking turns in serving as executives of the group. This 
accomplishment took 8 years of planning and self-discipline, virtues evident by fact that 
these women did not miss a single payment. That said, the group did admit experiencing 
instances where members were not able to pay, or of members disappearing.233 Their 
example is a testament to how group formation and joint-lending can strengthen resolve 
to make a plan work. Joint lending, through its inherent framework of providing a support 
group, is also a sphere in which members can train and assist each other. Moreover, the 
informational advantage that close proximity brings enables women to benefit, 
particularly in Bangladesh, where formal association of males and females is not 
common.234 
By building on themes of shared responsibility, microfinance enables each 
borrower a vision and identity of being one amongst a larger group. This sense of social 
capital is transferrable throughout the community, and a key feature of this component is 
that it encourages cooperation for the “mutual benefit of the members of the association 
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as well as for the society as a whole.”235 Moreover, in the context of female borrowing, 
joint-lending is a mechanism that treats each woman equally, thereby diminishing 
gender-related dynamics that may disempower females, or prevent them from partaking 
in the social or political process.236 In this way, a shared set of values and mutual 
empowerment is developed as a result of microcredit networks. 
The resulting social capital also appears to facilitate economic development. This 
is possible because the group lending dynamic of microcredit programs makes peer 
monitoring of co-borrowers easier.237 Thus, by reducing the cost of imperfect 
information and enabling collective action solutions, social capital becomes key for 
managing outcomes that pertain to the community level. This includes, for example, 
managing forest conflicts or issues of irrigated water distribution. In an economic sense, 
social capital is an asset because it is a form of public good which benefits all members 
of the group, not only those who are financially contributing.238 In this way, we again see 
a positive spillover effect of microfinance towards borrowers and non-borrowers alike. 
While the dynamics of political empowerment were introduced earlier, we can 
also consider the way in which microfinance is linked to another political aspect: 
democratic development. While there are well-studied correlations between social capital 
and democratic development, studies connecting the potential of microfinance to 
facilitate political activism remain largely unexplored.239 The underlying concept of 
social capital is that it produces a “dense civil society, which in turn, has been widely 
argued to be key to making democracy work.”240 Thus, social capital of certain forms can 
facilitate democratic development, through a number of mechanisms. To begin, it allows 
for a space in which discourse that evaluates governance is allowed. In turn, if existing 
group ties help to create a protective atmosphere for the discontented to voice their 
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grievances, without fear of reprisal, information can be further disseminated. This logic is 
supported by studies that show the increased likelihood of individuals to confront 
authority when they are in the company of friends.241 
Secondly, microfinance networks made of joint borrowers promote collective 
action in that networks function as “bloc recruitment” for social movements that oppose 
nondemocratic regimes.242 This sense of interdependence, then, leads to increased 
awareness of duty, further promoting respect within groups. Thus, “through participation 
in trusting associations, individuals may experience changes in their values, preferences 
and capacity to act.”243 In return, this increased awareness could make state-backed 
oppression more difficult, as a robust civil society is better equipped to organizationally 
oppose a nondemocratic regime.244 
In this way, arguments that link the association of social capital and political 
empowerment can also be applied to social capital and democracy. While Bayulgen 
admits that political empowerment and democracy are not the same thing, there is still an 
inherent association between the two. For the case of Bangladesh, in an environment of 
increased empowerment, the government can be more effectively held accountable, while 
individual demands can be better enforced. As efforts of microcredit NGOs further 
include enhancing education and/or literacy rates,245 this indirectly facilitates an 
increased awareness of constitutional rights.246 Illustrating how microfinance can support 
this reform is the finding that women’s involvement in public demonstrations and 
political campaigns increase once female members become borrowers within microcredit 
programs.247 
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Habib and Jubb found just that in their interview of 297 female ASA members 
and non-MFI respondents. Out of the ASA group, 68% engage in active participation 
with a political party, while 46% of the non-MFI group is active; this difference 
demonstrates MFIs do instill a sense of shared duty that invigorates the development 
process.248 
As a result of microfinance then, the outcome of democratic change, or some 
form of consolidation, is made more likely within networks with increased social capital. 
To support this claim, in 2003 Muhammad Yunus wrote of how Grameen borrowers 
began to associate their individual interests with that of their community: “He writes, for 
instance, that Grameen borrowers enthusiastically embraced the idea of exercising their 
democratic rights in the national election of 1991 in Bangladesh.”249 Habib and Jubb’s 
findings provide insight as to why MFI borrowers are enthusiastic. Citing the top factors 
that concern the rural poor, 41% of ASA member respondents stated that it is social status 
that influences their voting preferences, while 33% of the same group claimed that power 
and recognition within the community is their top driving factor in shaping voting 
preferences. The reported figures for desires of social status/power and recognition for 
the non-MFI group is starkly different, at 24% and 9%, respectively. For 43% of the non-
MFI group, voting is primarily swayed by pressure from local leaders, while only 17% of 
the ASA group expressed feeling pressure. Furthermore, ASA members seem to be less 
vulnerable to offers of extra money sources, as 12% responded saying that they are 
motivated by quick cash; in contrast, 39% of the non MFI group is swayed by cash 
payments. These differences in voting patterns reveal that MFI empowerment does result 
in the expectation of increased accountability from elected officials, shaping platform 
preferences—such as economic performance—that lead to conditions more conducive 
towards societal development.250 
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D. ASSESSMENT OF MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS’ INFLUENCE ON 
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND DEVELOPMENT 
Though developing democracy is not an explicit goal of microfinance, the above 
considerations demonstrate how democracy can be an outcome of microcredit. 
Furthermore, in reviewing from Chapter II, the conditions that led Bangladesh to become 
poor, it can be assessed that the establishment of stronger democratic institutions will aid 
in alleviating Bangladesh’s poverty, in that the poor are better informed and therefore, 
force state responsiveness. By deliberately fostering collective action, microfinance 
increases access to information and therefore leads borrowers to be made aware of 
“political issues, actors, processes and channels of influence.”251 As indicated further by 
Yunus’ assessment, microfinance goes beyond credit delivery. By creating forms of 
social capital, it facilitates the conditions that allow for democracy building.252 
Democratic progression, however, is contingent upon organizational reform, which 
requires more from civil action as a result of growth of civil society and the inculcation of 
social trust, than simply political empowerment alone. In order to overcome obstacles of 
government corruption and abusive land policies, Bangladesh’s middle class and rural 
base will need to collectively organize and push for reform, thereby optimizing skills they 
have gained from microcredit involvement. 
E. WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT 
Microcredit NGOs believe their programs are an entry point for effecting wider 
reaching social empowerment. Influencing this notion is the belief that, while women are 
more vulnerable in society, they are also positioned to benefit from development and 
economic growth.253 Single females head 15% of households within Bangladesh.254 In 
addition, based on adopted cultural norms, formal Bengali banks traditionally ignore 
women as loan candidates.255 For these reasons, many microfinance programs started 
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specifically targeting women in the 1990s, leading to females becoming the majority 
beneficiaries of microfinance programs.256 
Abul Md. Bashir contends that beneficial outcomes of women’s empowerment, 
however, are often perceived on the basis of changes in their economic behavior.257 
There are also non-economic outcomes that take place that can facilitate societal change 
and development.258 To address this theory, Bayulgen contends that by stimulating 
micro-enterprise development, women are led to increased income under their control. 
The outcome resulting from greater jurisdiction over resources, then, is improved well-
being, as well as reduced rates of mortality for children and themselves.259 This is 
possible because women are able to spend more on healthcare.260 In addition, women are 
more likely than men to use increased income towards the education of their children.261 
Under the effects of increased consumption, we know that food intake increases in 
households where the female head has obtained credit. These factors, then, help explain 
Bangladesh’s improving Millennium Development Goal (MDG) track record, which has 
targeted “extreme poverty and hunger, securing universal primary education and reducing 
child mortality.”262 
The character of microfinance programs support ongoing development within 
Bangladesh. Through literary and education initiatives, social change is reinforced by 
“group formation, leading to wider movements for social and political change” for 
women.263 A reduction of fertility rates is one such example: during the 1970s, women 
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bore an average of seven children; by 2000, however, Bangladesh had a broader spectrum 
of microfinance resources geared towards educating women, facilitating the average 
number of children per woman to drop to three. In the bigger picture, this shift allows 
women more time to work, paving the way for economic and social change. Similarly, 
the illiteracy rate for women also fell during the same timeframe, dropping from 88 to 
70%.264 Reflecting the success of MFIs in supporting Bangladesh’s overall MDG’s is the 
fact that 100% of second generation borrowers of Grameen are literate, while the literacy 
rate for Bangladesh as a whole is 64%. In addition, Grameen claims that 60% of its 
borrowers cross over and out of the poverty line, reflecting how overall MFI initiatives 
improve economic standing amongst poor women in Bangladesh.265 
Relatedly, enhanced economic standing within their household and community is 
another form of empowerment women benefit from. This is supported by the notion that 
greater access to savings and credit provides more sway in the decision-making that deals 
with savings and credit. When this is possible, women are better able to optimize the 
welfare of their household and themselves. At the same time, men can also benefit, as 
leakage of the additional income (which is in the hands of the female) is prevented. 
Furthermore, investment in women’s occupation allows for the spillover effects that were 
addressed earlier, including improved health (through greater access to medical care and 
information on birth control), access to education, increased literacy and political 
awareness, resulting in reduced the vulnerability of women.266 Supporting this theory is 
the fact that the number of female microcredit borrowers within Bangladesh is growing. 
Turning to Khandker and Pitt’s study once again, panel data between years 1991/92 and 
1998/99 shows that, while the average rate of male borrowers declined by 28.5%, the 
average for female borrowing increased by 94% during the same timeframe.267 
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F. ASSESSMENT OF MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS AFFECTING 
WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT 
The rise of women’s participation in microcredit programs suggests their 
expectation that access to credit will improve their livelihood. This also reflects the self-
efficacy aspect of Bayulgen’s hypothesis: women are taking their employment into their 
own hands. Furthermore, while the Bengali state is sponsoring reading programs that are 
driving literacy rates up, the parallel programs being offered by MFIs are tailored to 
refine literacy skills, particularly by targeting rural communities that may not be at the 
reach of the state and teaching them specific skills relevant to their needs. To this end, 
rural women are learning to read and conduct business in ways that include 
understanding and signing legal documents.268 This form of specialized empowerment is 
bringing women to the forefront of the civil domain. Thus, while independent impact 
studies have been few in number, existing evidence finds that women in rural Bangladesh 
benefit substantially from microloans.269 
G. INNOVATIVE FEATURES THAT ALLOW MICROLOANS TO BE 
SUCCESSFUL 
1. Targeting Female Borrowers  
Microfinance institutions are served well to target women, as females make up 
70% of the world’s poor. Among the reasons that substantiate targeting women for 
microloans is the fact that 60% of women surveyed in Bangladesh have complete or 
partial control over household investments, meaning they are well-positioned to augment 
their financial standing.270 Furthermore, access to microcredit will help balance the daily 
wage bias that women face; this bias is particularly evident for poor women, who 
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“typically work for longer hours, and when they are paid at all, will be so at lower 
wages.”271 
Grameen’s track record towards its female borrowers provides a lens through 
which the success of gender targeting can be measured. When Grameen initially started 
in 1983, most of its borrowers were men, while females made up 44% of its clientele. 
However, by 1986, females made up 75% of its customer base, with numbers increasing 
into the 1990s, while the current Grameen female membership base is now over 95%.272 
This increase reflects microcredit’s flexibility in adapting to poor women who are in a 
position to consider engaging in entrepreneurial activities. Supporting this notion is 
Muhammad Yunus’ assessment that women selling handmade crafts are compelled to sell 
their wares at a loss because they use input providers. On a large scale, this form of 
income deprivation is a contributing factor to poverty.273 The intent of microloans, then, 
is particularly suited to combat such forms of income deprivation for women. 
In addition, the impact of microloans may be greater when women are targeted 
because, compared to men, their decisions “tend to be biased in favor of the provision of 
public goods helpful for families and communities,” in addition to favoring health and 
educational related costs for their children.274 In turn, these choices will help contribute 
to the long-term development goals of Bangladesh. See Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.  Female Membership of Grameen Bank.275 
2. Joint Lending 
A hallmark innovation of microfinance is group lending, a feature credited to the 
success of Grameen Bank. Group or joint lending is a “mechanism that essentially allows 
the poor borrowers to acts as guarantors for each other.”276 This feature gives loan 
providers the flexibility to expand access to loans as their funding pots increase. 
Compared to the standard commercial bank contracts, which require collateral from an 
individual, Grameen’s classical group lending mechanism is a contract that leverages 
communal relationships. For example, a group contract can involve up to five borrowers, 
with loans being awarded to the first two, then to the next two, and finally the fifth 
member. The success of loan repayment denotes the continuation of the loan 
disbursement to the preceding group; however, if one member fails to pay off their debt, 
the members of the group are refused future loan disbursements. Another feature of joint 
loans is that repayments are made in public, which encourage participants to repay. This 
leads to the peer-to-peer monitoring aspect, which ensures neighbors can monitor their 




fellow borrowers, allowing members to make the most of “local information, peer 
support, and, if needed, peer pressure… The program thus combines the scale advantages 
of a standard bank with mechanisms long used in traditional modes of informal 
finance.”277 
H. ASSESSMENT ON THE EFFECTS OF TARGETING FEMALES IN 
POVERTY ALLEVIATION 
Targeting female borrowers is a strategic shift toward combating poverty because 
not only are women among the world’s poorest, but—in the case of Bangladesh—they 
are positioned to make the most of village based opportunities. Furthermore, compared to 
men, females have shown to be more responsive to the joint liability feature of 
microcredit programs, as joint lending enables women to mobilize in a way that is 
superior to acting as an individual, as groups provide a support base that otherwise is 
unavailable in the segregated formal sector of Bangladesh. The end result of making 
consistent group payments, then, means that women enjoy progressively increased access 
to loans, which helps augment their investment potential.   
I. CONCLUSION 
This analysis laid the key ways in which microfinance reduces poverty within 
Bangladesh. The intent of microfinance centers around addressing Bangladesh’s poverty 
level and the need of the poor in helping to escape the poverty trap. Tracking the direct 
impact of poverty changes has provided a lens through which the success of microfinance 
can be measured. Current statistical data, which has sampled a diverse range of random 
village communities within Bangladesh, demonstrates that microcredit programs geared 
towards the poor can alleviate poverty levels at the household level.  
This chapter analyzed empirical data of microfinance programs to find that they 
are successful in increasing income for borrowing households as well as households who 
are in proximity to borrowers. In addition, the deposit and savings mechanisms that are 
required by particular microcredit programs help promote healthy saving habits, while 
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leading to consumption smoothing. Meanwhile, this chapter suggests numerous spillover 
effects of small credit programs, including the inculcation of social capital and the 
building of civil society, which further compel a relationship to be drawn between social 
capital and democracy. In addition, this analysis investigated social development 
outcomes vis-à-vis women’s empowerment, and finds that women are benefiting from: 
direct guidance from MFIs, increased well-being, greater opportunities made available 
through higher income, and general empowerment that comes from being involved in a 
group. Mechanisms that allow microcredit programs to be fruitful were also considered, 
including targeting female clients and joint-lending. These innovative features of 
microfinance programs have facilitated the effectiveness of loan programs, aiding in 
Muhammad Yunus’ ultimate goal of alleviating poverty through microfinance. 
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VI. RESEARCH CONCLUSION 
This thesis posited the question as to whether microfinance alleviates poverty, and 
if so, what mechanisms contribute to its success. Chapter I presented the reasons as to 
why Bangladesh can benefit from microfinance-led reform: the nation’s human capital is 
its largest asset, its large agricultural workforce is in a position to benefit from the 
structure of microfinance programs, and microcredit organizations have tools and 
services that are flexible enough to reach and help the poor. Based on evidence presented 
in Chapter V, this chapter evaluates which of the hypotheses offered in Chapter I appears 
most accurate, as well as outline which of the MFI operation mechanisms are most 
effective. 
A. HYPOTHESIS ASSESSMENT 
The empirical data mentioned in Chapter V negates the notion that Bangladesh is 
ensconced in a poverty trap, showing ways in which aid has proven beneficial. The 
argument that microfinance only benefits current small business owners has been 
disproved, and the argument that those with little assets can improve their livelihood was 
demonstrated. The caveat to this, however, is that training and individual guidance helps 
ensure better results for the poor in augmenting their incomes. This then correlates with 
the assertion that only the core poor benefit- this is also not true, as studies show 
beneficial impact on non-borrowers as well. A third argument, that of targeting female 
borrowers will overall reduce poverty, has proved elastic, as success of a program’s 
impact has as much to do with how women treat their debt and income as much as 
whether they make more successful entrepreneurs than men. Still, the argument can hold 
that by targeting females, if quality of life is a way to measure poverty alleviation – then 
the non-economic outcomes that arise out of MFI participation do alleviate symptoms of 
poverty amongst women and their children. 
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B. HOW MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS ADDRESS BANGLADESH’S 
HISTORICAL LEGACIES 
Chapter IV covered historical and political milestones in Bangladesh’s history in 
order to outline how political and economic legacies shaped Bangladesh’s poverty. This 
understanding, then, helps shape the ways in which microcredit programs operate. To 
begin, by focusing on the development gaps that plagued rural Bangladesh, MFIs can 
address some of the structural causes that have led to the nation’s current poverty level. 
The role of MFIs in addressing this gap has included disbursing fertilizer, seeds and 
equipment that allow for more effective cropping;278 however, these development 
initiatives—when applied at larger scale—further require extending irrigation and 
cropping techniques. Thus, in addition to helping provide the right tools, MFIs also train 
and educate poor farmers, while offering credit programs so that they may be able to 
expand their operations. This then leads to the role of MFIs in serving as middlemen for 
joint-ventures that capitalize on open market economies, such as Grameen Danone Foods 
Ltd. This partnership not only created 1,600 jobs among the poor, but also continues to 
aid in economic growth. For instance, Grameen Danone purchases milk from micro-
farmers; once local employees have made yogurt, local women sell the food to receive a 
10% sales provision. Meanwhile, the yogurt is enriched to help individuals receive 
additional nutrients, which is intended to address malnutrition issues amongst the nation’s 
poor.279  
Chapter IV also illustrated how much of the gap that exists in Bangladesh’s 
shrunken export domain is the result of exploitation during colonial rule and during its 
existence as East Pakistan. More recently, however, the burgeoning garment industry in 
Bangladesh has provided an opportunity for export expansion, and is serving Bangladesh 
well in that over one million women from the rural population have gained 
employment.280 MFIs such as Grameen have further created opportunities for the poor by 
forming coalitions such as Grameen UNIQLO—a Japanese label that has partnered with 
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Grameen to produce South Asian and western garments that are made and sold in 
Bangladesh. Taking a cue from this joint venture, MFIs now need to attract additional 
foreign investors willing to expand other sectors—including formal industries that require 
technical production. Meanwhile, looking at the “paper tigers’” rise of South East Asia, 
MFIs can offer specialized incentives for market entry of entrepreneurs. For example, as 
India is turning to its service industry as a way to promote its own growth- MFIs in 
Bangladesh can take this opportunity and enter into India’s vast market, exporting to 
India’s 1billion plus market. MFIs already offer training programs and have donor 
capital, thus, the leap towards teaching these skills is an accessible one.  
In addition, Chapter IV demonstrated how the attention of Bangladesh’s rural 
community has historically focused on land distribution issues instead of the provision of 
public goods. In addition, incentives that encouraged farmers to productively invest and 
till land were few, as land property laws were not in their favor. As seen in Chapter V, 
MFIs are reshaping the outcomes of these legacies by offering training programs that 
encourage the formation of unions and federations, creating momentum to encourage 
rural participation in politics. This momentum is leading to greater accountability in the 
deliverance of public goods, thereby fostering politics that cater to the poor.  
Chapter V further provided empirical data by Khandkar and Pitt; and Chowdhury 
and Wright, showing that at the microlevel, poverty levels are changing in Bangladesh. 
Households that borrow are more likely to experience an increase in income, while non-
borrowing community members who live within the same community also benefit. This 
may be explained by the fact that as incomes rise, consumption also rises, and this 
spending takes place across the community, allowing more households to eat greater 
calories and receive better healthcare. Moreover, subjective and objective poverty rates 
also continue to decline the longer microborrowers stay within a program, while 
instances of political empowerment and self-efficacy are greater for program participants 
than their fellow non-borrowers.  
These economic and non-economic social spillover effects of microfinance are 
not unique to Bangladesh. With regards to targeting women borrowers, research 
conducted by Banerjee and Duflo finds that in Cote d’Ivoire, households in which women 
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make more money from their plots than their husbands also eat more, reflecting similar 
patterns found in Bangladesh, in that while male borrowers spend increased income 
elsewhere, women are more likely to invest in goods and services that will benefit their 
household.281  
Moreover, the versatility of joint-lending in its ability to empower women is also 
evident in international applications. A study conducted by Poverty Action Lab finds that 
in Mongolia, while two-thirds of women who engage in group-lending or individual 
lending invest their first loan into assets such as livestock or machinery (the remainder is 
used for household expenses), the women holding joint-notes are 9% more likely to end 
up owning a business enterprise than women who borrow as individuals. In addition, of 
those joint-borrowers, those who are less educated are 31% more likely to create a 
business of their own.282 Thus, the positive outcomes felt by households and women go 
beyond initial MFI investments.283  
C. MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS AND POVERTY ALLEVIATION IN 
THE DEVELOPING WORLD: MECHANISMS THAT WORK BEST 
Chapter I makes the case that microfinance models used in Bangladesh are 
versatile enough to be applied at the international level, and with this in mind, there is 
good news to share.  
Duflo studied a rural village of West Bengal in India, finding similar income 
generating results that Khandkar and Pitt find in Bangladesh. Duflo evaluated a 
microfinance organization called Bandhan, tracking financial outcomes after some 
livestock, a small stipend, and training to the poor are given. To receive this aid, Bhandan 
requires members to contribute to a mandatory savings plan. Duflo finds promising 
outcomes, as 18 months after the initial investment, recipients had an increased income of 
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20%, while their food consumption also rose at a rate of 15%. In addition, Duflo again 
witnessed a multiplier effect, in that “the increase in non-farm small enterprise income 
exceeded the gain in livestock income, despite the fact that beneficiaries almost all 
received livestock.”284 These results demonstrate that with tailored training, aid can 
improve the livelihoods of its recipients. 
For instance, savings and insurance programs amongst the poor have become a 
tool that can promote additional long-term gains in Africa. To support this claim, the 
organization New America relates of intervention programs in Uganda having greater 
“asset effects” on children, as the youth have a longer-time span to invest and form good 
spending habits than if they start saving as adults. Moreover, the second-generation 
children of microcredit borrowers learn of willpower and planning from the lessons and 
skills their parents are learning, thereby having greater confidence and aspiration in their 
adult years.285 Within the macro level, this shift in behavior means that good practices 
become engrained into widespread practice.  
In turn, the structure of savings and repayments of microloans lends to 
conditioning behavior. For the youth in developing regions, this is a particularly 
important lesson, as such programs “harness the critical development phases of youth,” 
while also shifting mindsets with regards to forms of risky behavior, such as that related 
to unsafe sex.286 Yet, this intervention has security implications as well, as MFI programs 
that target the youth are taking part in preventative measures that help address emotional 
setbacks287 or despair that draw individuals into terror and gang networks. In effect, 
innovative savings schemes enhance the prospect of asset accumulation for children and 
adults, addressing hazards that the poor face on a daily basis.288 
The benefits offered by MFIs go beyond the scope of income generation and 
savings. Chapter III addressed Proshika’s offerings of various development programs; 
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however, Proshika also offers its borrowers an insurance program that is linked to climate 
risk, which (as demonstrated in Chapter II) is a variable that significantly defines 
Bangladesh’s overall solubility. Recognizing the need to protect the rural population, 
Proshika offers an insurance program covering climate related catastrophe to over 2,000 
impoverished villages. Learning from Bangladesh’s experience, India is now amidst 
developing its own “smart schemes” and “smart cities,” as Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi is initiating “disaster management” programs that call for infrastructure and 
planning that will protect India from the effects of climate change.289 These insurance 
programs will protect India’s large farming community from monsoons and floods, 
natural occurrences that have led India’s agricultural wages to be “twenty-one times more 
variable than in the United States.”290  
In addition, joint lending is a tool that capitalizes on the makeup of agrarian 
populations in developing regions. Chapter III’s assessment of the way social networks 
impact joint-lending loans is underpinned by the fact that joint-lending works because it 
relies on geographical proximity, yet, joint borrowing also works because of the desire of 
individuals living in close-knit communities to maintain their reputation.291  
The horizontal networks that form out of the joint-lending process not only 
establishes greater social solidarity, but the premise is that it is a less obtrusive form of 
information gathering than having an “outsider” keep an eye on the group.292 This 
framework means that the joint-lending mechanism is adaptable across various cultures, 
like in the case of the women running the Roxy theatre in Ghana.  
The horizontal network that microcredit works off of has the added advantage of 
empowering communities as a whole. Grameen found that integration within a 
community allows its organization to ask clients to commit to life changing behaviors, 
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ranging from education of their children to subsistence farming.293 Yet, programs like 
Grameen and Proshika also teach about political rights, thereby indoctrinating political 
reform by shaping development initiatives. For instance, activists working with the NGO 
National Democratic Institute (NDI) publicly campaign against vote buying in villages 
across Uganda. Though results for NDI’s impact are pending, Banerjee and Duflo 
contend that Uganda’s similar newspaper campaign has had compelling results. In this 
way, NGOs and MFIs are decentralizing democracy, in that beneficiaries are made 
responsible “for making sure that schools, clinics, and local roads work well… handing 
anti-poverty policy…to the poor.”294 Thus, by holding public meetings and making use 
of face-to-face contact, instances of vote buying decrease, while voter turnout 
increases.295 Moreover, “the very act of working together on a collective project may 
help communities rebuild their social ties after a major civil conflict,”296 as is reflected in 
Habib and Jubb’s empirical data, which demonstrates a greater sense of civil society 
exists amongst MFI borrowers than non-borrowers of the same community. The 
combination of savings, joint lending, close proximity and group empowerment are 
factors that condition individuals to seek out ways to improve their own social standing. 
This habituation—extended over a long period of time—is helping shift social and 
cultural norms that will reduce symptoms of poverty, specifically by shaping how the 
poor interact in the political domain.  
Despite these distinctions, the obvious and possibly most important qualifier for 
microcredit programs is that they offer an opportunity to the poor when no other option is 
available. Moreover, MFIs cater to the needs of their environment, with representatives 
learning from borrowers about what works. The challenges that microfinance banks face, 
however, is how to ensure borrowers are successful. This leads to questioning the 
possibility of greater outcomes if borrowers are provided specific training- as 
entrepreneurship is not natural to all people. In an effort to validate if training makes an 
                                                 
293 Ibid., 120. 
294 Banerjee and Duflo, Poor Economics, 146–47. 
295 Alan Gerber et al., “Voting and Habit Formation in the United States,” J-PAL, accessed August 22, 
2016, https://www.povertyactionlab.org/evaluation/voting-and-habit-formation-united-states. 
296 Banerjee and Duflo, Poor Economics, 148. 
 84
impact on income generation, Karlan and Appel provide promising data. In Peru, they 
conducted a controlled experiment comparing business revenues of locals who received 
brief training from Foundation for International Community Assistance Peru, including 
bookkeeping and market information with locals who did not receive any such training. 
They find that business revenues of those that received training were higher, particularly 
during bad seasonal months, as the clients learned how to guard their business operations 
from fluctuations more effectively.297 A positive relationship between training and 
increased business success is further substantiated when Karlan and Appel find similar 
results in Mexico and The Dominican Republic.298 Their data provides insight that 
individual training can better equip borrowers with information to succeed as 
entrepreneurs. The essence of microcredit, then, is that it adapts to the poor. MFI 
branches that exist in environments where groups are culturally connected allow this to 
happen—a condition proven to make civil society more salient.299 Under the framework 
of behavioral economics, microcredit emphasizes social and group dynamics, lending to 
the efficacy of microcredit programs. For these reasons, the types of microcredit schemes 
applied in Bangladesh seem, anecdotally, to also be successful in alleviating poverty in 
other developing nations that have similar social and cultural structures. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The direct effects of microcredit have shown to reduce poverty. Simultaneously, 
the spillover effects of microcredit have proven to shape social and political outcomes 
that are positively affecting symptoms of destitution.  
Areas of study for future research may provide insight on ways in which 
microfinance institutions can continue to alleviate poverty. Currently, the primary goal of 
NGOs is not profit- but what if this were to change? For example, if the intent for banks 
and institutions is to make profit while serving the poor, will this then further incentivize 
the stakes to reduce poverty or will it leave out the real poor where chances on making 
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profit are unclear? Are there different mechanisms that for-profit organizations can offer 
that hinder or improve rates of poverty reduction? As the commercialization of the 
microcredit market is a new junction, commercial developments on poverty alleviation 
remain to be seen.  
Meanwhile, Bangladesh has made significant gains post-Independence in 1971. 
While Millennium Development Goals are being met through both private and public 
initiative, the innovative micro-movement is furthering the nation in its development 
goals and efforts to reduce poverty levels. With regards to international policy, the 
experience of Bangladesh serves as an example for other developing nations replicating 
Grameen’s microcredit model.  
In addition, with international trade and technology transfer underpinning the 
globalizing current, MFIs are in a position to take advantage of growing trade 
opportunities. Substantial widespread results, however, will come to bear only if poor 
individuals receive the education, training and access to information needed to make the 
most of these opportunities. The good news is that microcredit organizations are offering 
just that- and the private sector is catching on.  
  
 86
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 87
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Ahmad, Ibrahim. “How did the Pakistani Leaders Deprive East Pakistan during 1947–71 
which led to the Liberation War?” Accessed June 6, 2016. 
https://www.quora.com/How-did-the-Pakistani-leaders-deprived-East Pakistan-
during-1947-71-which-led-to-the-Liberation-war. 
Alavi, Hamza, and John Harriss. Sociology of “Developing Societies” South Asia. New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 1989. 
Armendariz, Beatriz, and Jonathan Morduch. The Economics of Microfinance. Second 
Edition. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2010.  
Attanasio, Orazio, Britta Augsburg, Emla Fitzsimons, Ralph De Haas, and Heike 
Harmgart. “Group Lending versus Individual Lending in Mongolia.” J-PAL. 
Accessed August 27, 2016. https://www.povertyactionlab.org/evaluation/group-
lending-versus-individual-lending-mongolia.  
Banerjee, Abhijit, and Lakshmi Iyer. “History, Institutions and Economic Performance: 
The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India.” Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology Department of Economics Working Paper Series, 02–27,June 
2002. http://economics.mit.edu/files/511. 
Banerjee, Abhijit V., and Esther Duflo. Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the 
Way to Fight Global Poverty. New York: Public Affairs, 2011. 
Banerjee, Abhijit, Esther Duflo, Rachel Glennerster, and Cynthia G. Kinnan. The Miracle 
of Microfinance? Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation. Cambridge: National 
Bureau of Economic Research, 2013. http://economics.mit.edu/files/5993. 
Basher, Abul. “Empowerment of Microcredit Participants and its Spillover Effects: 
Evidence from the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh.” The Journal of Developing 
Areas 40, no. 2 (Spring 2007): 173–83. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4193037. 
Bayulgen, Oksan. “Muhammad Yunus, Grameen Bank and the Nobel Peace Prize: What 
Political Science Can Contribute to and Learn from the Study of Microcredit.” 
International Studies Review 10, no. 3 (September 2008): 525–47. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25481991. 
Bera, Sayantan. “Programme Design and Impact Assessments: ‘Success’ of Microfinance 
in Perspective.” Economic and Political Weekly 43, no. 32 (August 2008): 77–85. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40277833. 
 88
Bhalla, Nita, and Jatindra Dash. “India is Building 100 ‘Smart Cities’ across the 
Country.” Reuters (March 2015). http://www.businessinsider.com/r-indias-smart-
cities-would-be-stupid-without-disaster-strategy-2015-3. 
Chowdhury, M. Jahangir Alam. “Poverty and Microfinance: An Investigation into the 
Role of Microcredit in Reducing the Poverty Level of borrowing Households in 
Bangladesh and the Philippines.” The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and 
International Relations, 2008. 
https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/14375/uploads. 
Chowdhury, M. Jahangir Alam, Dipak Ghosh, and Robert E. Wright. “The Impact of 
Micro-credit on Poverty: Evidence from Bangladesh.” Progress in Development 
Studies 5, no. 4/10 (2005): 298–309. doi: 10.1191/1464993405ps116oa. 
Gerber, Alan, Donald Green, and Ron Shachar. “Voting and Habit Formation in the 
United States.” J-PAL. Accessed August 27, 2016. 
https://www.povertyactionlab.org/evaluation/voting-and-habit-formation-united-
states. 
The Global Economy. “Bangladesh: Reserves.” Accessed June 3, 2016. 
http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Bangladesh/Reserves/. 
Grameen Bank for Small Business RSS. “What Is Microcredit?” Last modified March 2, 
2012. http://www.grameen-info.org/what-is-microcredit/. 
“The Grameen Creative Lab.” Accessed August 20, 2016. 
http://www.grameencreativelab.com/live-examples/grameen-bank-the-mother-of-
grameen-social-business.html. 
Habib, Mohsin, and Christine Jubb. “Role of Microfinance in Political Empowerment of 
Women: Bangladesh Experience.” Ontario International Development Agency, 
2012. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2185531. 
Hermes, Niels, and Robert Lensink. “Impact of Microfinance: A Critical Survey.” 
Economic and Political Weekly 42, no. 6 (2007): 462–65. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4419226. 
———. “The Empirics of Microfinance: What Do We Know?” The Economic Journal 
117, no. 517 (2007): F1–F10. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4625473. 
Hossain, Mokerrom. From Protest to Freedom: The Birth of Bangladesh: A Book for the 
New Generation. Dhaka: Shahitya Prakash, 2010. 
Kabeer, Naila, Simeen Mahmud, and Jairo G Isaza-Castro. “NGOs and the Political 
Empowerment of Poor People in Rural Bangladesh: Cultivating the Habits of 
Democracy?” World Development 40, no. 10 (October 2012): 2044–2062. doi: 
10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.05.011. 
 89
Kalpana, K. “Shifting Trajectories in Microfinance Discourse.” Economic and Political 
Weekly 40, no. 51 (2005): 5400–5409. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4417553. 
Karlan, Dean, and Jacob Appel. More than Good Intentions. New York: Penguin Group, 
2011. 
Khandker, Shahidur R. “Microfinance and Poverty: Evidence Using Panel Data from 
Bangladesh.” The World Bank Economic Review 19, no. 2. Oxford University 
Press (2005): 263–86. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40282216. 
———. Review of The Economics of Microfinance by Beatriz Armendariz, 
Jonathan Morduch. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 56, no. 2, 
University of Chicago Press (2008): 484–90. JSTOR. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/523604. 
Lewis, David. Bangladesh: Politics, Economy and Civil Society. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011. 
Mayoux, Linda. “Microfinance and the Empowerment of Women: A Review of the Key 
Issues.” Accessed March 10, 2016. 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_emp/documents/publication/wcm
s_117993.pdf.  
———. “Women’s Empowerment and Micro-Finance Programmes: Strategies for 
Increasing Impact.” Development in Practice 8, no. 2 (1998): 235–41. JSTOR. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4029310. 
Metcalf, Barbara D., and Thomas R. Metcalf. A Concise History of India. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
Microcredit Regulatory Authority. “List of Licensed MFIs as of February 25, 2016.” 
Accessed March 23, 2016. 
http://www.mra.gov.bd/images/Licensed_NGO_MFIs/licenced250216en.pdf.  
Mymensingh. “An Enterprising Beekeeper.” Daily Star. Last modified January 28, 2016. 
http://www.thedailystar.net/country/enterprising-beekeeper-208357. 
Pitt, Mark M., and Shahidur R. Khandker. “The Impact of Group Based Credit Programs 
on Poor Households in Bangladesh: Does the Gender of Participants Matter?” 
Journal of Political Economy 106, no. 5 (1998): 958–96. JSTOR. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/250037?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents. 
Proshika. “What Proshika Does.” Accessed 17 August 2016. 
http://www.proshika.org/what-proshika-does.html. 
Rachavan, Srinath. 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2013. 
 90
Ray, Indrajit. “Identifying the Woes of the Cotton Textile Industry in Bengal: Tales of the 
Nineteenth Century.” The Economic History Review, New Series, 62, no. 4 
(2009): 857–92. JSTOR. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27771525. 
Ray, Ratna, and Ray Rajat. “Zamindars and Jotedars: A Study of Rural Politics in 
Bengal.” Modern Asian Studies 9, no. 1 (1975): 81–102. JSTOR. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/311798. 
Rouf, Kazi Abdur. “Grameen Bank Women Borrowers Non-Formal Adult Learning 
Transformation in Bangladesh.” Global Journal of Management and Business 
Research, 14, no. 1, Version 1.0 (2014). 
https://globaljournals.org/GJMBR_Volume14/3-Grameen-Bank-Women-
Borrowers-Non.pdf. 
Sen, Amartya, and Satayajit Ray. “The Bengal Famine of 1943.” Poor Economics. 
Accessed June 7, 2016. 
http://www.pooreconomics.com/sites/default/files/14.73_Food_Lecture4.pdf. 
Sharma, Monica. “Beyond Capital Gains, The Multiplier Effect of Youth Savings.” 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, July 2012. 
http://www.cgap.org/blog/beyond-capital-gains-multiplier-effect-youth-savings. 
Sobhan, Rehman. “The Problem of Regional Imbalance in the Economic Development of 
Pakistan.” Asian Survey 2, no. 5 (July 1962). 
Talbot, Ian. Pakistan: A New History. Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2015.  
Zaidi, S. Akbar. Issues in Pakistan’s Economy: A Political Economy Perspective. Third 
ed. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2015.  
  
 91
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
